Design for Six Sigma in the Charting of a Cuban Transition

Design for Six Sigma in the Charting of a Cuban Transition

Jorge Luis Romeu, Ph.D.

Research Professor, Syracuse University= , Syracuse NY 13244

Email: jlromeu@syr.edu Web: http://myprofile.cos.com/romeu<= /p>

ASCE 2008 Annual Conference F= inal Version: Sept. 21, 2008

De Dulcinea, en ansi= as de tu muerte,

Di que siempre sera = La Mas Fermosa.

Enrique Hernandez Miyares<= span lang=3DES style=3D'mso-ansi-language:ES'>

Abstract:

In a previous paper (Ro= meu, 2007) presented a year ago, we proposed using Six Sigma tools to study how = to foster a Transition in Cuba= . We discussed how the five DMAIC Six Sigma phases (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control) could be implemented. And we developed, with the limit= ed information available at the time, the first two phases: Define and Measure= .

The present paper is a natural extension of= the first one. With the information from the events occurred in the past year, we pur= sue this study. But now, we use a variant of the Six Sigma methodology known as Design for Six Sigma (DFSS).

This variant is used in cases where the sys= tem under study does not exist, but is being designed (the DMAIC methodology is for improving the quality of an existing system). The difference is that, in DF= SS, the last two DMAIC phases (Improve = and Control) are substituted by Des= ign and Verify. We now explore this variant, as the Transition will signifi= cantly modify the existing situation in Cuba. And this is similar to = implementing a new design.

Biographic Note:

&n= bsp;

Jorge Luis Romeu is a Res= earch Professor in the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Syracuse University. He studied Mathematical Statistics in the Univers= ity of Havana, and work= ed as statistician in Cuba= until 1980, when he moved to the US. Romeu holds a PhD. in operations research, is a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society and a Sen= ior Member of ASQ. He founded the Juarez Lincoln Marti International Education Project (http://web.cortland.edu/matresearch) and has publi= shed and presented extensively about Cuba, its human rights, and its socio-economic, educational and political problem= s. Romeu’s web page is: http://myprofile.cos.com/romeu

Design for Six Sigma in the Charting of a Cuban Transition

Jorge Luis Romeu, Ph.D.

Research Professor, Syracuse University= , Syracuse NY 13244

De Dulcinea, en ansias de tu muerte,

Di que siempre sera La Mas Fermosa= !

Del Sone= to La Mas Fermosa,

de Enrique Hernandez Miyares<= /o:p>

Introduction =

This paper is a follow-up from (Romeu, 2007) and we re= fer the reader to this material for background on Six Sigma and for an in-depth discussion of the need for a peaceful Transition to pluralism in Cuba. H= ere, we develop a variant of Six Sigma, known as Design for Six Sigma, and we conti= nue discussing the problems surrounding said event.

There are two good reasons for using the Six Sigma methodology here. First, it is a tool from our professional arsenal; one th= at we know well and we have used successfully to improve or redesign service a= nd industrial organizations. Then, a national government is just a huge service organization. And Six Sigma provides a framework and roadmap for implementi= ng change, with a well-defined and tried sequence of steps or phases.

However, if the Six Sigma nomenclature gets in the way= of the reader not familiar with this approach, just ignore it. This doesn̵= 7;t prevent understanding the main concepts and ideas developed here. For those interested in learning more about Six Sigma see Gryna et al. (2007).

There is no question that the Cuban Transition has alr= eady started. Fidel Castro, who headed the Cuban government for almost fifty yea= rs under various titles (Commander in Chief, Prime Minister, President of the Republic, First Secretary of the Communist Party, etc.) has officially reti= red.

After a year-long hiatus where, due to his serious ill= ness, the elder Castro delegated the daily running of the government to his brother R= aul, Fidel announced that he would not run for re-election as President. Then, t= he Cuban National Assembly, a rubber-stamp parliament that meets for a few days every year and signs the bills submitted to it by the Council of State, ele= cted Raul, up to then Minister of the Armed Forces, as the new President, thus o= pening up a new chapter in the history of Cuba.

General Raul Castro has headed the extensive Cuban Mil= itary apparatus (FAR) for nearly fifty years. The FAR includes many large and var= ied organizations, in far removed economic areas such as Tourism and agriculture. Thence, Raul brings a wealth of management experience, something that Fidel always lacke= d. In turn, Raul lacks the charisma of his brother. In fact, they represent two v= ery different styles, and it shows.

Raul Castro started his presidency by announcing sever= al important economic changes. These include that idle lands in state farms and cooperatives will be turned over to private farmers, willing to work them. = These will be able to buy farm equipment, tools and supplies from government stor= es. And their farm products would be sold in free markets to the general popula= tion. Raul also said that some salaries and pensions would be raised, and that workers would hereon be compensated according to their productivity. So much for the egalitarianism fostered by the elder Castro.

Cubans are now allowed to buy (with convertible pesos) consumer items such as cell phones and computers, hereto restricted to government officials. These changes have se= rious consequences, some negative and some positive. Among the negative ones, we = find that only Cubans with convertible pesos, obtained via dollars from tourism or foreign Remesas, will enjoy these products. And this only widens the al= ready-deep division among them. On the positive side, some civil society organizations= have been able to use the Internet and have create discussion lists and Web Page= s, providing its members a broader access and contacts with others, both inside Cuba and abroad. Such contacts have been widely used for requesting badly needed humanitarian aid and information, after the recent Hurricane Ike devastated the island in September.

There have also been opportunities lost, on both sides= . For example, a European Union organization recognized Yoanis Sanchez, a young C= uban woman, for her work as a Blogger. However, the Cuban government did not all= ow her to travel abroad to receive the award. And even when releasing a small numb= er of political prisoners, the Cuban government still keeps the majority of di= ssidents detained in 2003, in jail. On the other hand, the 48 year old US Embargo and other economic constrains regarding traveling to Cuba and to sending Remesas, archaic remnants of the C= old War era, remain in place just as before Raul’s access to power.

The European Union has also softened the political and economic measures imposed on Cuba after it jailed the 80+ dissidents in 2003. For example, the cocktail war, where Cuban dissiden= ts were invited to some European diplomatic events, and government officers boycotted them, seems to have ended.

Summarizing, we believe that Cuba is now in a position aki= n to that of Spain in the early 1960s, when General Franco appointed Laureano Lopez Rodo and h= is Opus Dei team, to lead the country= out of its economic malaise. Such economic opening created objective conditions= for Spain’s peaceful transition to pluralism, just a few years later. We believe the sa= me may occur in Cuba if Raul becomes another modernizer.

The alternative (i.e. if all sides stay the present co= urse) could lead to a situation akin to that of the Soviet= Union in 1981, at the death of Leonid Brezhnev. For, Cuban leaders from the Casto= rs generation are also in their late 70s and 80s, and hence may serve for five or ten yea= rs. Then, as it occurred in the Soviet Union= , it may be too late for a Cuban Gorbashov to stop an institutional collapse, produc= ed by the faltering socioeconomic conditions in the island, yielding disastrou= s results for everyone, in particular for the Cuban people, The Exile community and t= he US gove= rnment.

Finally, let’s analyze the Transition event itse= lf. There are those, on both sides of the argument, who will go to any length to obstruct or prevent it –because it hampers their interests. And there= are those who would like to see it happen, but for very different reasons. Among the latter there are at least three groups.

One group sees a Transition as an opportunity to obtai= n some breathing air, thus using it to maintain the present situation, under some cosmetic or minimum change. Then, there are others who want to use the Transition to destroy the regime and punish its leaders. Finally, there is a group, to which this author subscribes, that sees a Transition as the way f= or Cuba to= return to its natural course, heal its wounds and become, as Jose Marti said, a country “con todos y para el bien de todos”. Whenever in this s= tudy the collective “we” is used, it definitely refers to this third group.

In the rest of this paper, we apply the Design for Six= Sigma methodology to analyze the current Cuban situation as well as its prospects= of developing a peaceful Transition.

Background

In Romeu (2005 and 2007) we discussed in-depth some re= asons for, and the international problems related to, the development of a succes= sful Cuban Transition. We enumerated and analyzed a number of successful transit= ions occurred during the XX Century. And we derived some common characteristics = they exhibited. For its importance, we summarize them again. They tell a very vi= vid story.

Among the successful IberoAmerican Transitions we can mention:

Spain, after Franco's death, = in 1975.
Portugal= , after Salazar-Caetano, in 1973.
Chile, after Pinochet's retirement, in 1989.
Brazil, after the Generals retirement, in 1980.
Mexico, after the PAN succeeded the PRI, in 2000.

Some unsuccessful examples of IberoAmerican Transition= s are

Venezuela, after General Juan= V. Gomez' death, in 1936.
Brazil, after both of President Getulio Vargas' terms, in 1945 and 1954
Argentina, after both of General Peron's terms, in 1955 and 1973
Argentina, after the military dictatorship and the Malvinas war, in 1985
Mexico, after General Porfirio Diaz' exodus, in 1911.
Dominican Republic, after Rafael L. Trujillo's death, in 1961.
Nicaragua, after the Somoza dynasty was overthrown, in 1979;
Nicaragua, after the Sandinistas lost the elections, in 1990.
Honduras= , after General Carias Andino was deposed, in 1954.
Guatemala, after General Jorge Ubico was deposed in 1944.
El Salvador, after the military regime lost control, in 1979
Haiti, after the Duvalier dynasty was overthrown,, in 1986,
Cuba, after President Machado and the revolution of 1933.
Cuba, after both of General Batista's exodus, in 1944 and 1959.
Paraguay= , after General Stroessner was overthrown, in 1989.

Examples of other Transitions occurred in other parts = of the Third World:

Turkey, after Kamal Ataturk's death, in 1938
China, after the death of Mao Tse Tung, in1976
Soviet Union, after Stalin's death, in 1953,
Soviet Union, after the Brezhnev gerontocracy, in 1985

Viet Nam, after the death of = Ho Chi Minh, in 1969

North Korea, after the death = of Kim Il Sung, in 1994

Angola, after Agostino Neto a= nd successors
Mozambique, after FRELIMO
Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde

We found that all successful Transitions had in common= the factors outlined below. And we also found that unsuccessful Transitions lac= ked pre-existence of one or more of them.

Existing, even if embryonic civil society
Internal opposition cooperation and civility
Lack of Intervention from super-powers

Arbitration and cooperation= from peer nations

Arbitration and Cooperation= from international blocks
Prior governmental economic opening
Degree of internal peace and stability
Environment for future economic growth
Size and location of a country, regarding superpowers

The most recent Transition, occurred in Zimbabwe, has President Mugabe finally sharing power with his opposition. President Mbaki= of neighboring South Af= rica, brokered it.

Six Sigma DMA= IC versus Design for Six Sigma

In our Romeu (2007) we used the traditional DMAIC Six = Sigma methodology (Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve and Control) to study the Cu= ban Transition process. Hence, we implicitly approached the problem as a modification of the current system= .

In the present paper we implement the Design for Six S= igma (DFSS) methodology, whereby a system is completely designed from scratch. T= here is no underlying message here: just a desire to improve this investigation, using additional tools. In any case, modified or re-written from scratch, t= he long term changes that the Cuban system will require, compared with the cha= racteristics it currently exhibits, will be substantial.

Both Six Sigma DMAIC and DFSS methodologies, share the= first three phases (Define, Measure and Analyze). However, they define and measure different things, because DFSS builds a new system and there is little to evaluate. The two methodologies also differ in their last two phases. DMAIC Implem= ents and Controls the changes made to the existing system, while DFSS Designs such system, and then Verifies that it does works.

According to Juran’s quality planning road map (= Gryna et al., 2007), in an improvement effort we have to implement the following steps, yielding the corresponding outputs:

Step 1 Def= ine a Transition. For us it means a deliberate (non violent) change from what we currently have, to something different (hopefully better). Define the proje= ct mission statement, scope and goals. Define the Transition Team responsibilities, sc= hedules etc. There has been a lot of discussion about this among the Cuban community inside and abroad, within the government and the opposition, overt and cove= rt. The different parties must now get together and compare notes, negotiate and reach some consensus.

Step 2 Ide= ntification of all Transition Stake-holders is not straight forward. Once this is accomplished, we need to convince such Stake-holders that the expense (in t= ime, effort and sacrifices) of this whole Transition exercise, is worth their wh= ile (i.e. the new system is better than the current one). Motivation is essenti= al.

Step 3 Ide= ntifying Stake-holder needs is difficult. Then, different people want different thin= gs. Their needs and wants are not always (1) easy to pay for, or (2) consistent= with each other (i.e. antagonistic). We need to find areas of agreement and to negotiate them, for the Transition to take off. Cubans need to master the a= rt of the give-and-take. To help in this phase, the presence of a mutually acceptable Arbiter is essential.

Our Discussant has recommended that we give additional= and specific guidance to Steps 2 and 3. This is difficult at this stage, with t= he scant information that we have. But based upon the experience gained from studying previous successful transitions, we have designed a Flowchart for developing such activities. It is shown in the Appendix.

The results of= Steps 2 and 3 constitute the Business C= ase. In the development of Stake-holder needs, their requirements and the processes leading to their fulfillment, DFSS uses the QFD Matrix Cascade. The detailed discussion of the Business Case and of= the QFD Matrix Cascade constitutes the main objective of this paper.

Steps 4, 5 and 6 of Juran’s improvement methodol= ogy are beyond the problem scope, at this time and with the current information, and will be developed in their proper moment.

The main Six Sigma tools used in these activities incl= ude Quality Function Deployment (QFD) matrices, Fault Trees, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, and Pareto, Flow and Ishikawa charts. They have already be= en defined and illustrated in Romeu (2007), for the current Transition context. They can also be found in Gryna et al., 2007.

Only the QFD matrix cascade, given its importance at t= he core of the DFSS methodology will be discussed in detail, after seeing how = the Business Case is built.

Making the Bu= siness Case

Changing is always stressful, whether in the personal = or in the organizational realm. To accomplish a successful change, we must start = by convincing all those involved in it that change will result in their benefi= t. Otherwise, change won’t occur; or it will only be cosmetic. Such convincing is what is known as making the business case.

First, we need to identify the stakeholders, i.e. those participants who will be directly affe= cted by change. And we have to make the Business Case to them. That is, to show unequivocally how the new or transfor= med system will improve conditions for= them. The readings upon which we base our business case for this research are included in the references of this paper, as well as in those of Romeu, 2005 and 2007.

There are at least five different groups of stakeholde= rs to whom we must make a very strong business case, if we want to have a peaceful Transition to pluralism in Cuba. They are: (1) the current Cuban Government officials, (2) the Cuban People (inside Cuba), (3) the Cuban Exiles (Diaspora), (4) the US Government, and (5) concerned governments, from Europe and Latin America. We overview the corresponding Business Cases below:

The first group, the current Cuban Administration, inh= erited a dysfunctional and bankrupt economy that cannot satisfy the needs and want= s of the Cuban people. It has implicitly recognized this fact, by rapidly moving= in the economic reform area. A compounding factor is the advanced age of the present Administration leaders. Succession crises are a common problem for = most one-party and personal political systems. Hence, Cuba may face a similar situa= tion to that of the former Soviet Union with the succession problems created by Brezhnev’s death. This would result in= a disastrous situation for everyone involved, and must be avoided at all cost= s.

On the other hand, by actively fostering a paced but effective Transition, to an economically more open system first, but a plur= alistic one at the end (as it occurred in Spain after Franco, and is oc= curring in China= and Viet Nam) the Cuban leaders may ensure their own survival and legacy. Some may find t= his naive. But as national leaders arrive to an advanced age, legacy becomes an important behavior driver.

The second group, the Cuban People in the island, is c= urrently suffering the brunt of fifty years of Fidel Castro’s socio-economic a= nd political policies. Daily ordinary economic needs are widely unfulfilled. B= asic individual human rights such as free speech, free press, free political and union organizations, are lacking. Collective economic rights such as free a= nd universal health care, free education and full employment, which were once = the pride of Castro’s regime, have significantly eroded.

The Cuban people inside the island need to improve the= ir standard of living expand their individual human rights and revamp their collective economic rights. These are very real and complex needs, and must= be addressed openly, honestly and urgently by a Transition team before any oth= er, including political and ideological ones. We have received much criticism f= or holding this position, and will defend it further in the discussion section= .

In particular, there is a basic right that everyday Cu= bans have been missing all along; one which is essential for improving their standards of living, as well as all other rights. It is the right to work independently. Currently, most Cubans cannot undertake independent work assignments (e.g. as plumbers, carpenters, electricians, doctors). For, it = is either outright forbidden, or excessively taxed. Hence, liberalizing private citiz= en’s economic activity must be the First Step in any Transition.

The Second Step must be to move to a single currency system in Cuba. The current dual curren= cy system is unacceptable, economically as well as ideologically, and is at the root of most Cuban grievances. It is extremely inefficient, as it adversely affects labor markets and price systems as well as the speedy flow of produ= cts and services.

Freedom to contract work will, simultaneously, help cr= eate jobs and raise income for the average workers, while solving shortages and providing inexistent or deficient services. Creating a single currency will help abolish the current two-track system, where Haves and Have-nots are now those with and without acces= s to convertible peso.

The third group, the Cuban Exiles (Diaspora), have been absent from the island anywhere from one to fifty years. Many may want to r= eturn, either as visitors and tourists, or to spend part of their retirement years= , or to re-initiate their lives there. The first step must be to re-establish the right to send money and goods to relatives and friends in Cuba, w= ithout unreasonable and politically-motivated constrains. The second step must be to re-establi= sh the right of all Cubans, inside and outside the island, to freely enter or leave their country of birth.

Political pluralism is a prime concern of a large part= of the Exile community. However, Cubans inside the island are primarily concer= ned with their daily and severe economic problems, which must be solved first. Hence= , political pluralism will simply have to wait. For, in addition to the stated prioriti= es and resource limitations, there are currently no independently organized political parties, or civil society inside = Cuba, no nationally recognized political leaders, no free press, etc. which are necessary pre-conditions to the establishment of a stable and lasting pluralistic society.

Even if political pluralism were magically handed to C= ubans tomorrow, the many and small internal dissident groups currently active cou= ld not take over and run the country. Dissident groups lack administrative experience, cohesion, and nation-wide, grass-root support. Hence, either ch= aos would arise, or government would fall under the influence and manipulation = of extraneous forces.

On the other hand, an economic opening like the one Lo= pez Rodo developed in Sp= ain in the 1960s, will incrementally be followed by other openings in all aspec= ts of private and public life, including economic, social and ideological. Thi= s would allow the creation of the necessary infrastructure (political parties, civil society, media, experienced, widely recognized leaders) that will make pluralism possible and stable. Pluralism unavoidably follows economic freed= om. It just takes time and patience. Trying to hasten it will only result in its delay, as well as in other undesired side effects.

The fourth group, the US Government, would benefit from having a stable and friendly country 90 miles off its shores. One where the= re are no uncontrolled balsero mig= ratory waves, or one that serves as a trans-shipment stage for drugs and other ill= icit operations.

Moreover, Cuba’s status not only affects US national security, but also its relations with the other Latin American countries who are carefully following the events. For, the US must= choose between two strategies or courses of action (COA), regarding Cuba= 217;s Transition, which correspond to short and long term strategies.

The short term COA consists in imposing a time table a= nd a short list of conditions for the Cuban government to fulfill. This COA fail= s to recognize that, inside the Cuban government as well as in the US and = in the Exile community, there are some who see a Transition as a problem and adamantly oppose it. The short term COA would only strengthen their position, and eit= her slow or stop a Transition. In addition, it would send a questionable signal to <= st1:place w:st=3D"on">Latin America, about US policies toward the region.=

The long term COA is consistent with the current Ameri= can strategy toward China and Viet Nam, and with the end of the Cold War. It encourages economic change and waits f= or the social and political changes to follow. This COA also sends a message t= o Latin America, about the US not imposing its will by strength. Such message creates good will, an important commodity in today’s world circumstances (terrorism).

Finally, the fifth group is composed by concerned governments in Europe and Latin America. They understand that stability in Cuba wi= ll substantially improve the regional economic and political climate, and are willing to ser= ve as Arbiters in the process to achieve it. On the other side of such arrange= ment, several Latin American countries have legitimate economic and political con= cerns about a Cuban return to the fold. These must be openly, honestly and swiftly addressed and resolved by a Transition team. Some of the reasons for them a= re discussed at length in Romeu (2005) and Romeu (2008).

International support is absolutely necessary for a successful Transition in Cuba. It is especially important for providing the safeguards and arbitration fun= ctions that the Cuban and U= S governments (two long-time foes) require, for such a process to advance.

Summarizing, there exist essentially three positions. A Transition can be (directly or indirectly) Fostered, Hampered or Ignored. We believe that there currently exists a unique window of opportunity that mus= t be seized. If lost by inaction or incompetence, many more years of unnecessary suffering, for those actively involved, and of undesired secondary effects,= for those watching from the side lines, will ensue.

The QFD Matrix Cascade

In this section we discuss some technical aspects of t= he QFD matrix, or Quality Function Deployment. QFD, also known as “the House= of Quality”, is one of the most powerful and useful Six Sigma improvement and design tools, and was explained and illustrated in the current Transiti= on context, in Romeu (2007).

A Matrix Cascade consists of a sequence of concatenate= d QFD matrices, each one stemming from the prior matrix. Through them we define t= he entire change paradigm. It comprises at least four successive matrices that relate (1) Stakeholder with Stakeholder Requirements, (2) Stakeholder Requirements with Transition Features, (3) Transition Features with Transit= ion Process Features, and (4) Transition Process Features with Transition Process Contr= ols.

Once having identified and defined the components of t= hese four matrices, and their relationships, the matrix cascade permits us to go from one to the next, in a complete and precise way. An illustration of this process is presented in Figure II of the Appendix.

In the case of a Cuban Transition, the Stake-holders <= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> include: current government leaders, communist party members, the military, police and secret services, Cuban workers, peasants and professionals, retirees, unemployed, independent work= ers, students, women, infants, Cuban exiles, past and present political prisoner= s, and external participants (i.e. foreign countries) among others. Transition needs to ensure that Stakeholders will benefit from the process and that th= ey are well-aware of this, as well as of how this will occur.

Stakeholder Ne= eds include: personal safety during and after transition, national stability and peace; economic prosperity, including substantial increase in housing, food= and consumer goods; gainful employment, with freedom to work and to sell one= 217;s products; improvements in infrastructure and power, transportation communic= ation systems, among others. A rapid and general economic improvement is crucial = to the Transition.

Transition Fea= tures facilitate and make it possible. They include: absence of reprisals to form= er government officers, retirement of prominent ones and re-incorporation of the remainin= g, to the national life; release of all political prisoners and their re-incorpor= ation to national life; return of expatriates and re-incorporation to national li= fe; right for all Cubans to enter and leave the country freely; right to work, = to freedom of expression and to the organization of civil society, among others.

Transition Pro= cess Features facilitate the process evolution. They include: revision of current economic and social laws, land and other property provisions; of the judicial system, civil society, newspapers and media, political association= s; banks, unions and professional organizations; of pension plans and public services (education, health, unemployment), among others.

Process Contro= l helps enforce the process development. They include: reorganization of the police, army and security apparatus, popular representation system, independent rad= io and TV stations, newspapers, and civil society organizations, among others.=

The above list is not exhaustive by any means, but cle= arly illustrates how the Transition will affect most activities and institutions. Precisely because of this, changes have to be made at a deliberate pace, integrating rather than dislocating the composition of the social fiber; perfecting rat= her than disrupting it, and through open discussion and consensus, rather than through back-dealing and imposition. Changes will require the cooperation of all segments of Cuban society, of all elements of the Cuban political spect= rum, and a lot of give-and-take and good will. But foremost, the changes will require time. Rome= was not build in a day –and neither will Cuba.

To ensure that Transition changes are successfully implemented, detailed failure analyses via Failure Trees (FTAs) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs) should be made. They were described and illustrated in the Transition context in Romeu (2007). Anticipating most po= ssible failures and problems, and acting to either prevent them or successfully compensating for them, are essential for project success.

Some Useful S= ources of Income

A successful Transition requires sizeable sources of i= ncome that can finance the desired quality of life improvements. These can be obtained from abroad, along with not always convenient obligations. Alterna= tively, such income can be (at least partially) generated internally. Below we over= view some new revenue sources to consider.

Medical Touris= m is based on Cuba’s extensive health apparatus. Such infrastructure, now overhauled and moderni= zed, can be enhanced by the international relations fostered by an economic aper= ture brought about by a Transition, adding to the island’s current Latin American customers, many more= from the EU, US and Canada.

Retirement res= orts and time shares could be built for those Cuban exiles who would like to spe= nd some time every year in the country of their birth, and also for foreign nationa= ls seeking Cuba’s mild climate and lower cost of living. Such time sharing complexes may prov= ide basic medical facilities for the aged. Small apartments could be built in differe= nt provinces, and sold or leased for periods of, say, two weeks to two months = per year.

An Internation= al container super-port could be built in one of its ample bays (Mariel or= Matanzas). Super-= ports in the US Eastern seaboard and the Gulf are now at full capacity. A container super-port in Cuba would allow the transferring of merchandise from large ships arriving from = Europe and Asia = into smaller vessels sailing to the US ports, and vice-versa. Cuba’s geographical situation lends itself magnificently for this function.

A computer pro= gramming haven, based on = Cuba’s well trained engineers, can be created similarly as in Ireland= . Cuba is= much closer to the US than India, facilitating the needed face-to-face work contacts over the Florida straits, easier than over the = Pacific Ocean.

A High Tech ha= ven, for industrial production, such as the one currently operating in the Dominican Republic, can also be created, taking advantage of the well-trained Cuban labor force= and the island geographical proximity to the US.

The Reconstruc= tion of Old Havana, declared Patrimonio= de la Humanidad by UNESCO, can be achieved through a procedure similar to the= one used in Venice, during the 1960s. Small houses can be leased or sold to Cubans willing to repair them and live in them. The larger palaces can be leased to internati= onal businesses and organizations, interested in transferring and lodging their Latin American offices in Historic Havana.

The proceeds from such sources will pay for revamping = public education, health care, the reconstruction of Cuba’s infrastructure (= roads, railroads, airports, ports; water and power networks; phone and postal serv= ice; army, police and government installations, etc.). The employment generated = will compensate for jobs lost to modernization of many inefficient organizations that will have to disappear.

Discussion

Many of the premises and conclusions of our present pa= per have been strongly criticized by our Discussant, as well as by several other colleagues. They essentially disagree with our position regarding Transition priorities (i.e. economic reconstruction first, political considerations later), and on the treatment of current Cuban leadership and institutions. =

We believe our critics confuse the issues, here. We are proposing a peaceful Transition in Cuba. S= uch process is defined as a negotiation= between those currently out of power and those who detent it. They share po= wer in order to modify the course of events because, as it stands, things are n= ot working. This is the way Transition was stated in Spain, in 1975.

What our criti= cs propose is not a Transition; it is an unconditional surrender of the current power holders, such as it occurr= ed in Germany, in 1945, or more recently in Irak (2003). We find this alternative course of action both, unreasonable and unsustainable.

To begin with, we would never want to see something like that occurring in Cuba. T= hen, we would like to know where our critics plan to find the army to impose such conditions to the Cuban government, and then the resources to support the ensuing occupation.

The only forces behind our current Transition proposal= are those of Reason and History. We offer President Raul Castro’s administration the example of Portugal, in the 1970s.

There, illness incapacitated Dr. Salazar, as it has incapacitated Fidel Castro, after 40+ years of holding absolute power in the country. In Portugal= , Marcelo Caetano inherited the position, just as Raul Castro did in Cuba. C= aetano failed to move as fast as needed, and in the direction the country required, and was overthrown by Portugal’s own younger military, product of the same Portuguese system, who finally in= stituted a pluralistic democracy in the country. Let this be a historical lesson to consider in Havana= .

This said, we strongly believe Cuba is entering a period sim= ilar to that of Spain around 1962, when Laureano Lopez Rodo and his Opus Dei team lead the country out of its economic malaise. Lopez Rodo’s economic changes did not directly address Franco’s political framework. But it fostered Spain&#= 8217;s peaceful transition to pluralism years later.

We have seen economic transitions occur in China a= nd Viet Nam, after the deaths of Mao and Ho. Economic liberalization policies have also created opportunities for political and social openings. Historically, economics has had a great part in advancing political rights.

If Raul Castro’s administration fails to liberal= ize Cuba= 217;s current economic and social structure, the country may follow the Soviet Union, after Brezhnev’s death. For, as= it occurred in the Soviet Union, younger le= aders may take over, anyway. But it may be too late to prevent a collapse, leading to socio-economic and political turmoil (unrest, civil war, massive illegal emigration, and foreign intervention) disastrous for everyone, including th= e US gove= rnment and neighboring nations.

On the opposition side, if we want a Transition to take place, we need to help bring it about. We need to carefully organize, plan = and prepare conditions for its development. And we must start by becoming the chan= ge we want to see (Mahatma Gandhi).

If we want an open society in Cuba, we must provide an example of such open society abroad. One that openly= and frankly discusses all political alternatives in its press, TV and civil society organizations, = and not only those alternatives that it espouses. We need to become more tolerant with those, among our own ranks, whose opinions differ from ours. We need to substitute unconstructive name-calling by a civil and open-minded exchange of ideas, and to drop the obsolete Cold War rhetoric.

We need to objectively evaluate the consequences of the different a= lternatives proposed, under the light of what is best for the long-term future of the Cuban Nation. Then, we have to = convince others that our ideas and approaches are better, and then take into consideration the suggestions, corrections, changes etc. that those others may provide.

We need to take adequate action. Some times, the best action consists in doing nothing, letting others take = the lead and supporting them as best we can. The Cuban government must accept just criticism without accusing its critics of being traitors or foreign agents. We must all find common ground, an= d we must then proceed by building on them.

Exiles must recognize that our role is not a leading one, but a supporting one. There a= re Oscars for supporting roles, too. Inside the island, all must acknowledge why we left, and recognize that we are still part of the Cuban Nat= ion. Thus, we have not only the right but also an obligation, to participate in = the reorganization and chartering of Cuba’s future.

Finally, the i= nternational community must recognize that a stable and pluralistic Cuba is= more beneficial in the long run, than a Cuba that can, at any moment, implode. They can help the Transition by serving as honest brokers, and by encouraging, supporting and proposing ideas t= hat foster change. But never by imposing schedules, conditions or specific courses of actions that will, in the final analysis, only delay any possible change.

Conclusions

A Transition to pluralism in Cuba (or anywhere else) is no= t an easy task. But, especially in the Cuban case, and for the reasons discussed= in this paper, it is a necessary one. At this time history presents a unique w= indow of opportunity (akin to that of the German reunification, in 1991). We must seize the moment! As the old Franciscan saying goes: we must have the wisdom to accept what we cannot change, to change = what we cannot accept, and to distinguish between these two. And finally, we need to have the courage and intelligence to start working for c= hange.

Change takes time and patience. It will require stamin= a, good judgment and faith in the final result. But if we have faith, and do a= ll that is needed, success will come in due time.

Acknowledgeme= nts

Many friends and colleagues, in ASCE, ASA and other organizations, have contributed to our work with information, suggestions, criticism, etc. We thank them all. ASCE has always provided us with an open forum to present our ideas, no matter how different from that of others the= se may be. We pride ourselves of its membership, for that.

Finally, we thank our Discussant, Dr. Armando Linde, Proceedings Editor, Dr. Jorge Perez-Lopez, and= ASCE colleagues A. Cuzan, M. Reyes, R. B. Romeu, J. F. Alonso, and so many others for their com= ments, suggestions, and often, much needed criticism.

Bibliography<= o:p>

Cuzan, A. (2004). “Franco’s Spain and Castro’s C= uba: Parallels and Contrasts. ASCE Proceedings. ASCE (Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy).

Gryna, F.,= Chua, R. C, DeFeo, J. (20= 07). Juran’s Quality Planning and Analysis= for Enterprise Qualit= y (5^th Ed).

Moreno = Fraginals, M. (2002). Cuba/España; España/Cuba: historia común= . Biblioteca de Bolsillo. Ed. Crítica. Barcelona.

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Moreno Fraginals, M. (1976). El I= ngenio (The Sugarmill: the socioe= -conomic complex of surgar in Cuba). Monthly Review Press. New York.

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Ortiz, = F. (1973). Contrapunteo Cubano del Azucar y el Tabaco.<= /u> Editorial Ariel. Barcelona.

Romeu, J. L. (2007). ”A Six Sigma Analysis of the Cuban Transition”. ASCE Proceedings Pp 278—287. ASCE (Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy).

Romeu, J. L. (2005). “The Spanish Caribbean and its Influence in a Transition in Cuba”. ASCE Proceedi= ngs. Pp. 197--204. ASCE (Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy). Washington, D= .C.

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Romeu, R. B. (2008). Vacation Over: Implications for t= he Caribbean of Opening US Cuban Tourism. Internationa= l Monetary Fund Working Paper.

Saco, J= . A. (2001). Papeles Politicos Sobre Cuba. Editorial Cubana. Miami.

Appendix:

Figure I: Exa= mple of Transition Process Guidance Flowchart:

Flowchart Content:

Start Planning

Initiate Contacts for Negotiations

Establish Stakeholder Working Groups

Seek Arbiters to assist the Process

Are tArbiters acceptable to all Stakeholders?

Yes: Go to No. 4

No: Find causes, re-negotiate and Go back to No. 4

Stipulate each Stakeholder conditions

Are Conditions Acceptable to all?

Yes: Go to No. 8

No: Find causes, renegotiate and Go back to No. 6

If impasse; seek assistance from Arbiters

Continue the Transition process …

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Figure II: Illustration of a QFD = Matriz Cascade.