The Spanish Caribbean and its Influence in a Transicion in Cuba</tit= le> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceType"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceName"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"City"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"place"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"country-region"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"State"/>  <style>  </style>  </head> <body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'tab-interval:.5in'> <div class=3DSection1> The Spanish <st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Caribbean</st1:place> and its Influence in a Transition in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p> Jorge Luis Romeu<a style=3D'mso-footnote-id:ftn1' href=3D"#_ftn1" name=3D"_ftnref1" title=3D""><![if !supportFootnotes]>[1]<![endif]></= span></a><o:p></o:p> <st1:place = w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Syracuse University</s= t1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">NY</st1:State><= /st1:place><o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"mailto:jromeu@ecs.syr.edu">jromeu@ecs= .syr.edu</a> <o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> ASCE XV Annual Conference<o:p></o:p> <st1:place = w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Miami</st1:City> <st1:State w:st=3D"on">FL</st1:State></= st1:place>, August of 2005<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p></sp= an> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>Introduction<o:p></o:p></h1> When Fidel Castro came to power= in 1959, Cubans on both sides of the political differend committed a costly st= rategic error. We allowed our internal struggle to become a football in the Cold War game. Castro sided with the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Soviet Union</st1:place>= , at a time when a nuclear war could destroy everything. The Cuban opposition sided with the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United Stat= es</st1:place></st1:country-region>, who sought to prevent the establishment of a Soviet foothold, 90 miles from= its shores. We Cubans have never learned that old American saying: “polit= ics ends at the water’s edge”. Nor have we learned from the Mexican lesson of Maximilian and the French intervention of the 1860’s, when = the conservatives, after loosing the civil war against Juarez and the Liberals,= requested their help.<o:p></o:p> In the case of Cuba, the United States launched its economic embargo, which Castro adroitly used, to bring together the country around him to face of a foreign enemy, as well as to p= lay little David, both very old strategies for such situation. And the Cuban op= position distanced itself from <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Latin America</st1:place> and = the Spanish Caribbean, because the region supported Fidel Castro and his government, fo= r practical political, economic, strategic and demagogic reasons. This was yet another = costly miscalculation, one that alienated the Cuban opposition from its natural La= tin American milieu. We failed to understand the real causes behind their behavior, and = to finesse its response adequately. <o:p></o:p> For, the Spanish Caribbean coun= tries did take advantage of the Cuban situation in at least three ways. First, we= all produce similar goods: sugar cane, tobacco, coffee, fruits and seafood. Our sister nations obtained the Cuban quotas in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D= "on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> markets, and also inherite= d the American tourism and economic investment. <o:p></o:p> But historically, this was no different from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region>’s policy during the 1790s, under Governor Luis de Las Casas and his Economic Adviser, don Francisco de Arango y Parreno. For, after the Africans revolte= d in Haiti destroying that island’s slave-based economy, Cuba seized the opportunity to launch its sugar and coffee industries that, until then, had= languished due to the intense competition of this French colony. Sleazy as this policy= may be, such is the usual procedure in international relations.<o:p></o:p></spa= n> Secondly, as the political atte= ntion of the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States= </st1:place></st1:country-region> focused on Castro’s <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, it eased on the other Spanish Caribbean countries, giving them greater lati= tude. Their governments thence, had an added interest in maintaining Castro’= ;s regime, from which they scored excellent points both, economically as well = as politically. <o:p></o:p> Finally, several of our sister republics were far from democratic, and could not provide a better life for their citizens. Hence, they found it convenient to nominally support the government in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana</st1:plac= e></st1:City>, while maintaining the privileges of their upper classes at home. For, such political posturing is appealing to their poverty-stricken masses and diver= ts the attention away from their own lack of civil and political liberties, go= ods and government services. Some people refer to such procedures as demagoguer= y. <o:p></o:p> We can summarize the above disc= ussion into three main reasons that have helped sustain the present Cuban regime f= or the past 46 years. They are (1) President Castro’s political shrewdne= ss and ability to survive, (2) the Cold War and the <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy toward <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a= nd (3) the economic and political interests of the Ibero American and other foreig= n countries, vis-à-vis the Cuban regime. <o:p></o:p> However, in the past few years = several significant events have occurred, directly affecting the above three circum= stances and opening a unique window of opportunity that facilitates a Transition to= a pluralistic system and a normalization of the Cuban situation.<o:p></o:p></= span> First, President Castro is clos= e to 80 years now, nearing the end of his natural life. His brother Raul, the official heir to <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cub= a</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s Presidency, has a slim chance of becoming his successor. For, there have be= en already two entire generations of capable leaders lost to the absolute cont= rol of the Castro clique. Finally, the deteriorated socioeconomic and political conditions inside the island encourage the possibility for negotiations bet= ween Castro’s younger successors, and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s internal and ext= ernal opposition. <o:p></o:p> Second, the end of the Cold War= more than a decade ago, has left the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> as the only world superpower, thus diminishing the danger of a nuclear confrontation. This allows the possibility of implementing a change in the 45-year-old American policy toward <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pla= ce w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, without the <st1:countr= y-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> loos= ing face or endangering its security. <o:p></o:p> Finally, Ibero <st1:country-reg= ion w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>= has advanced politically and economically, in the last half century, and its interests are now broader. Today, they can prosper without having to prey on the Cuban economy. And they need a stable and pluralistic <st1:country-regi= on w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> if= they really want to foster their own economic development and political pluralism that will bring even more support from the European Union, the <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> and = other <st1:place w:st=3D"on">First World</st1:place> governments.<o:p></o:p> The implementation of a peaceful transition, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region> or anywhere else however, requires a negotiation process between the opposi= tion and those at the helm. But such negotiations need the presence of a mutually acceptable arbiter or facilitator, to help negotiate the differences and to= guarantee the terms of the agreements. Such arbiter could naturally come from Ibero <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>= and the Spanish Caribbean, as occurred for example, during the bloody civil wars in= <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Central America</st1:place> in the 1980s.<o:p></o:p> But, at the present time, such = facilitators or arbiters are not likely to materialize, due to the lack of trust and eve= n dislike, between the Spanish Caribbean countries and the Cuban opposition. For, in addition to the elements discussed above, there are other historical and mo= re subjective reasons.<o:p></o:p> We Cubans have considered ourse= lves whiter, richer and more sophisticated, than most other Ibero American countries, du= e to our longer colonial status under <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region> first, and to the proxi= mity and special status with the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>, later. This has made us feel superior, many times putting down our own and = looking north-ward, instead, like the statue of Diana Cazadora situated in Paseo de= la Reforma, in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico City</st1:p= lace></st1:City>. This attitude has not won many friends in Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D= "on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and adds a dimension= of resentment to the above-mentioned political and economic reasons for them to remain al= oof.<o:p></o:p> It is, however, imperative to s= how how much all the above reasons are passé and wrong, and conduce no where. It is imperative that Cubans recognize how we are a Spanish Caribbean nation and hence, of Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>. And it is imperative to show the Spanish Caribbean nations how we will all gain, and not loose, if Cuba resolves its internal problems peacefully, thr= ough a process of negotiations facilitated by our own, and not by others, further away. This is what we try to do here.<o:p></o:p> Therefore, these are the two ob= jectives of our paper: to show how the Spanish Caribbean is Cuba’s political habitat, to which it belongs geographically and culturally, and to show how such habitat can play a major role in Cuba’s transition to pluralism, after President Castro’s natural and inevitable disappearance, provid= ing the badly needed facilitators and increasing its possibilities of successful oc= currence, in the minimum time and with the minimum cost.<o:p></o:p> In the rest of this paper we di= scuss the origins, development and fragmentation into isolated countries, of the peoples and nations integrating the Spanish Caribbean. Then, we discuss some implications of the participation of such nations in facilitating the proce= ss of a peaceful Transition to an open society in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"= on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>Common Historical Roots <o:p></o:p></h1> We spouse the hypothesis that t= he Spanish Caribbean is one, homogeneous, with specific characteristics in each country but with a common identity. One could then legitimately ask why it is that = today, such <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> is not united, but fragme= nted into a host of isolated, small, and poor countries. <o:p></o:p> To provide some answers to this= challenging question we must first define what we understand by the Spanish Caribbean: = the socioeconomic and cultural collection of islands and coastal areas of the Caribbean Basin proper, as well as selected coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico, which were colonized and held by Spain throughout the XVI to the XV= III Centuries and who struggled through independence wars and nation building in the XIX and XX Centuries. <o:p></o:p> Consequently, we do not include= in the Spanish Caribbean the islands colonized by the French, English or other Europeans, nor the parts of the Caribbean coast of Central America populate= d by the Black Caribs or Garifuna. We mean <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st= =3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:City>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:= country-region></st1:place>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st= 1:country-region>, plus the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> coasts of <st1:countr= y-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-regio= n>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Colombia</st1:place></st1:country-region= > and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Panama</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= the Gulf coast of the Mexican states of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st= =3D"on">Veracruz</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:State></st1:place> and <st1:State w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Campeche</st1:place></st1:State>, and to a lesser extent, sele= cted areas of the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> side of <st1:coun= try-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Honduras</st1:place></st1:country-region= > (e.g. <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">San Pedro Sula</st1:place></st1:City>) a= nd <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Costa Rica</st1:place></st1:country-regi= on>.<o:p></o:p> Their common characteristics are visible and evident, even to the weekend tourist. They include speaking the same language, practicing the same religion, playing the same music, dancin= g to the same rhythms, having similar ethnic mix, eating the same food and fruit= s, and having a common colonial history, including suffering the same Spanish neglect during the XVI to the XVIII centuries. <o:p></o:p> The proof is that we name our r= hythms (e.g. son, merengue, cumbia), our roots (e.g. yautia, yuca), our fruits (e.= g. lechosa, papaya, platano, banano), our fish (e.g. pargo, guachinango, chillo), etc. = with different names, when they are essentially the same. Finally, there may wel= l be less African blood in the mainland, and more in the islands of the Spanish Caribbean. But we all are all, at least culturally, a mixture of white and black with American Indian. <o:p></o:p> Our main colonial cities and to= wns (<st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">San Juan</st1:place></st1:City>, <st1:Ci= ty w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, La= Habana, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santiago</st1:place></st1:City= >, Porto Bello, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santa Marta</st1:place>= </st1:City>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cartagena</st1:place></st1:Cit= y>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Barranquilla</st1:place></st1:City>, <st= 1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Maracaibo</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"= on">Veracruz</st1:State></st1:place>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Campeche</st1:place></st1:Sta= te>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Merida</st1:place></st1:City>, etc.) were founded in the same century and look very much alike. Their traditional old sections are so similar, that often movies about one country are made in another. We wear the same guayaberas, use similar straw hats, smoke large cigars and play equally romantic and slow boleros, in our Spanish guitars. = But most important, we share this huge mass of water, with its beautiful beache= s, that some times unites us and other times, separates us.<o:p></o:p><= /p> Spanish colonialism formed our = souls, giving us its laws, political traditions, good and bad customs, and inventi= ng the Creole and the mestizo. Similar military authorities, absentee landowne= rs and corrupt and incompetent administrators, governed us, and similarly independent-minded Creoles practiced extensive and illicit commerce with the buccaneers. These American-born Spaniards now lived side by side with Afric= ans, both slaves and free, frequently mixing with them, and thus fusioning into = this semi-magic combination of European, Amerindian and African that is our Span= ish Caribbean ethnicity and culture. If you doubt it, go back and re-read Cien = Anos de Soledad.<o:p></o:p> Historical examples of such com= mon policies and customs also abound. In <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, the Spanish governor burned cities and haciendas in the eastern part of the island (<st1:country-region w:st=3D"on= "><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>) in the XVII century, t= o eradicate the illicit commerce of its inhabitants, forcing them to relocate to the ea= stern side (now, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region>). This facilitated the take-ove= r of the western part of <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Hispaniola</st1:place> by the Fr= ench. In <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place><= /st1:country-region>, the Spanish governors could never deter similar commerce in the eastern par= t of the island, where cities like Bayamo amassed its great wealth, based on con= traband.<o:p></o:p> The peoples of the Spanish Cari= bbean became homogeneous because they were formed in a slow process that took 300 years.= The discovery of gold and silver in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Peru</st1:place>= </st1:country-region> during the mid 1500s, where the conquistadors could become rich very quickl= y, helped empty the Spanish Caribbean. Most Spaniards who initially had settled in the islands left, taking their slaves, their Amerindian servants and even their animals. Those few who stayed, languished and mixed with the remaining slav= es and Indians, for the next three centuries. As a result, <st1:place w:st=3D"= on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:City>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">Cuba= </st1:country-region></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> and the other parts of the r= egion were, at the end of the XVIII Century, approximately 1/3 white (Spaniards and Cre= oles), 1/3 mixed race and free, and 1/3 black or Amerindian, mostly slaves and indentured servants. However, the majority of these slaves had been born in= the Spanish Caribbean, spoke Spanish as their first language and had acquired m= any customs of the other two ethnic groups.<o:p></o:p> By contrast, in the French and English colonies, Europeans were very few (less than 10%) and most of them, were transient employees of commercial plantations that stayed for only a f= ixed period of time. The slaves (the remaining 90%) were so badly mistreated, th= at thousands had to be imported every year, to replace the dying. As a result, the major= ity of the population was integrated by slaves recently brought from <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Africa</st1:place>, with no common language and no bonds, eithe= r with the people or with the land itself. Finally, there were few mixed-race or f= ree blacks, that could serve as an ethnic or social buffer between races, or between the socioeconomic classes. <o:p></o:p> This situation worsened in the = XIX Century, when Chinese and East Indian indentured servants (read, slaves) we= re brought in large quantities to work in the fields, once African slavery was formally abolished. As a consequence, islands like <st1:place w:st=3D"on">T= rinidad</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Tobago</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Curaca= o</st1:place>, and nations like <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Sur= iname</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Guyana</st1:plac= e></st1:country-region>, live under great social and racial tensions from the different racial, reli= gious and linguistic groups that populate them and who have never integrated. <o:= p></o:p> The explosive economic, social = and ethnic composition in the French and English colonies led, for example, to = the bloody and violent slave rebellion of 1794 in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and the subsequent mas= sacre of the white population. The proof that in the Spanish Caribbean social conditions were different is that, after the 1822 Haitian invasion and subs= equent occupation of <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</s= t1:place></st1:City> (which lasted for 22 years) no massacres of whites ever occurred. Slavery w= as indeed abolished by Haitian President Boyer, and a land reform among the former sl= aves, at the expense of the property of the church and the state, was implemented= . But white Hateros and merchants kept their properties and wealth. And when in 1= 844, the war for independence started, white, black and mixed race Dominicans equally fought to expel the Haitian invader. For, it was not the color of the sk= in, but the language, religion, culture and customs what defined the inhabitant= s of Santo Domingo –as well as what defines the people from the Spanish Ca= ribbean.<o:p></o:p> Another salient characteristic = of the region, and one which greatly facilitated its homogeneity, was the ease of communication. Hundreds of sailboats crisscrossed the <st1:place w:st=3D"on= ">Caribbean</st1:place> during the XV to XIX Centuries, carrying goods and products, people, news, = etc. Its inhabitants constantly moved from one place to another. Examples of well-known military, political and cultural leaders, that moved around in t= hese areas during the XIX Century include Bolivar (in Haiti), Duarte (in Puerto Rico), Maceo and Maximo Gomez (in Honduras, Costa Rica), Marti (in Mexico a= nd Venezuela), Henriquez Urenas (in Cuba) and Hostos (in the Dominican Republi= c). <o:p></o:p> During the XX Century Romulo Betanc= ourt and Juan Bosch lived in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, A. Sanchez Arango, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on= ">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and Castro, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexic= o</st1:place></st1:country-region>. World-renown artists Rafael Hernandez, Agustin Lara, Armando Manzanero and Celia Cruz lived and worked everywhere in the region. This author’s o= wn family came from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1= :place></st1:country-region> to <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></= st1:City> during the XVIII Century, where our first American ancestor was born. In the following 250 years, the family moved to <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico= </st1:place> and finally to <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region>, leaving many collateral family members all over the region, in their wake. = <o:p></o:p> Such movements of peoples and g= oods were possible because, for over 300 years, these areas were part of <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, = and all its inhabitants held a common nationality. There was no currency to exchang= e, no new language to learn, no passports or visas to apply for, no work permi= ts to request, all of which facilitated these common and frequent exchanges. E= ven in the coastal areas of the mainland colonies, such as <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Colombia</st1:place></st1:country-region= > or <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= with richer and stronger governments, people still preferred maritime travel along the = <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place>, to avoid the perils and difficulties of = the slower and less comfortable land travel. For this reason the Spanish Caribb= ean people remained closer to each other, than to their own political and administrative colonial kindred. <o:p></o:p> For example, peoples from <st1:= place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Veracruz</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"o= n">Campeche</st1:State></st1:place> and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Merida</st1:place></st1:Ci= ty>, traditionally preferred to travel to <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana<= /st1:place></st1:City> by schooners (goletas) for health, educational or business reasons, than to= <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico City</st1:place></st1:City>, by l= and. And in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:pl= ace></st1:country-region>, which up to the XVIII Century was administratively dependent from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, pe= ople traveled from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caracas</st1:pla= ce></st1:City> to Ciudad Primada (<st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domin= go</st1:place></st1:City>), as well as from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cartagena</st1= :place></st1:City> and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Barranquilla</st1:place></= st1:City>, via La Guaira. This situation persisted even after the region’s indep= endence, and well into the XX Century when finally good roads and railroads were bui= lt and the airplane appeared. <o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>The Winds of Change <o:p></o:p></h1> Such was the situation up to the start of the Latin American independence movement, in the early XIX Century, when most Spanish colonies became separate nations. Then, the first legal a= nd economic impediments to free interaction within the Spanish Caribbean, appeared. Local caudillos and dictators, such as Paez in Venezuela, and San= ta Anna in Mexico, and those who followed them during the XIX and XX Century, = as well as the Spanish colonial authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, were not interested in having their subjects move freely, escaping their control and exploitation. <o:p></o:p> In spite of this, the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> still provided the fastest, most economic= al and technically feasible means of transportation, making any policy of isolatio= nism very difficult to enforce. Thus, for economic reasons the Spanish Caribbean remained a homogeneous entity, even when it started showing the first signs= of differentiation.<o:p></o:p> For, the region started separat= ing ideologically. For example, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> remained Spanish colonie= s, and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1= :City> became, first a Haitian and later a Spanish domain. It was not until the se= cond half of the XIX Century that the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region> obtained i= ts total independence, only to become a poor, weak and unstable republic, like many = of the other Spanish Caribbean countries.&nbs= p; <o:p></o:p> Then, a new factor appeared in = the region. Since the 1820’s, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pl= ace w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>, an emerging re= gional power, had become increasingly noticeable in the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Car= ibbean</st1:place>, its southern and natural border. With its growing military, economic and industrial power, and its stable republican system that included the possib= ility of maintaining slavery, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> became a very attractive option for the landed classes and the aristocrats = of the Spanish Caribbean. Hence, in many of these countries, the prospect of Annexation to the American Union was not only strongly considered, but acti= vely pursued.<o:p></o:p> In <st1:country-region w:st=3D"= on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, for example, the Annexa= tion movement had a strong following between 1810 and 1865 among large plantation owners such as Madan and Aldama. The Narciso Lopez expedition that landed i= n <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cardenas</st1:place></st1:City> in 1853 displaying our Cuban flag for the first time was part of the annexation movement. Only after Jose A. Saco, political leader and scholar, openly opp= osed such ideology and proposed the autonomy option as one more appropriate for = <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, d= id the annexation idea begin to dwindle.<o:p></o:p> In <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, Presidents Santana and B= aez were also annexionists. Pedro Santana re-established the Spanish suzerainty= in the island during 1860-64, while Buenaventura Baez sought, first the French= and later the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:pl= ace></st1:country-region> annexation, without much success. During the Mexican-American war of 1846-4= 8, and later during the War of the Castes (1848-1852), <st1:State w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:place></st1:State> (which at the time included today’s states of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Merida= </st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:State></st1:place> and Quintana Roo) t= oyed with the though of incorporation to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st= 1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></s= pan> When the American Civil War put= an end to slavery, Spanish Caribbean aristocrat interest in joining the <st1:c= ountry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> wane= d. However, a sentiment of inferiority persisted among some, who longed for political and economic stability at all costs and believed that our nations were unable to govern themselves. Such individuals entertained the idea of a limited national sovereignty, under foreign tutelage, fueling the frequent = interventions that we have suffered in the last two centuries. Examples are too numerous = to name.<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> Cuban <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Indepe= ndence</st1:place></st1:City> and the XX Century <o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> fought several wars for its independence, starting in 1868. These armed struggles did not succeed for internal political and economic differences in the island. In the eastern p= art, conditions were similar to those previously described for other regions of = the Spanish Caribbean. The western part, with its huge sugar plantations and co= nstant importation of slaves, had become a small-scale version of the model that t= he French had developed in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>. And Cubans still remembered what had happened there in 1794. <o:p></o:p></s= pan> However, the first independence= war (1868-78), even when lost, produced large effects. Slavery was officially abolished, a= nd a free press, a pro-autonomy political party, and very defective and unfair, = but regular elections were finally allowed.<o:p></o:p> Cuban independence was finally obtained in 1898, but only after the plantation system in the Western provi= nces had been destroyed by the war, and a coalition known as Partido Revoluciona= rio Cubano, was forged by Jose Marti. The war was won with the military aid of = the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-r= egion>, which acquired <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> and the <st1:= country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Philippines</st1:place></st1:country-reg= ion> from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:plac= e></st1:country-region>. As a result of this war, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:s= t=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> emerged as a world power, thus increasing yet further its economic and political influence in the Spanish Caribbean. <o:p></o:p> The rest of the <st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> territories (e.g. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Ja= maica</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Lesser Antilles</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Curacao</st1:place>) remained in the hands of powerful European nations, thus minimizing the <st= 1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> infl= uence. But the small, poor and disorganized Spanish Caribbean republics became an object of the American foreign policy in the region. American military intervention and political manipulation of leaders and governments were frequent, generating a sentiment of ill-will against the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-r= egion>. Such sentiment was later exploited by unscrupulous political leaders, contr= ibuting to increase social and political instability in our countries, and providin= g support for several XX Century nationalist and anti-American movements.<o:p></o:p><= /span> Summarizing, the Spanish Caribb= ean, which under <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</s= t1:place></st1:country-region> and until the early XIX Century was united and homogeneous, slowly began separating into several weak and disorganized nations. Frequent government incompetence and corruption increased their poverty as well as their politi= cal instability, bringing about dictatorial regimes. <o:p></o:p> We can establish a parallel bet= ween the current state of the Spanish Caribbean, and that of the Roman provinces= in the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mediterranean</st1:place>, after the fall of <st= 1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Rome</st1:place></st1:City> in 425. Thes= e provinces were invaded by barbarians, who established weak and unstable kingdoms that brought 1000 years of backwardness and chaos, known in European history as = the Dark or Middle Ages. After centuries of struggle, <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:= st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Italy</st1:place></st1:country-region> j= oined several other nations to integrate the European Union, through which these Mediterranean countries have again achieved world influence and clout.<o:p>= </o:p> <o:p></o:p>= <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>The Spanish <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> in a Possible Transiti= on<o:p></o:p></h1> This brings us to our main topi= c: how can the Spanish Caribbean and Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pl= ace w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region> help develop a peacef= ul Transition in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</= st1:place></st1:country-region>? For, there are two parties to this negotiation: the government in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana</st1:place></st1:City>, and the o= pposition (internal and abroad) and we need to pose some hard questions. What can bot= h of these parties offer each other? How can they guarantee their promises? Who = can facilitate and mediate these conversations? <o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> is economically and politicall= y exhausted. The opposition can offer the government, in exchange for a transition to political and economic pluralism, much needed economic aid, technical know-= how, their international business connections and internal stability. Economic a= id would rapidly increase the wealth of the nation, as well as the socioeconom= ic level of the individuals, thus bringing internal peace.<o:p></o:p></= p> To guarantee these promises, as= well as the safety and integrity of the government officials, the negotiations n= eed of arbiters other than the Cuban government, the internal and external opposition, or the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">U= nited States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. For, as interested parties, neit= her the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></= st1:country-region> nor the Cuban opposition will be trusted by the Cuban officials, or vice-ve= rsa. However, such trusted arbiters can come from Ibero <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Western Europe</st1:place>, especially from the Spanish Caribbean nations, who hav= e a strong interest in the economic and political stability of the region to wh= ich we all belong.<o:p></o:p> Further more, all parts to this negotiation are today in a better position to work toward a negotiated Tran= sition. The <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></= st1:country-region> is the sole, remaining superpower and no longer needs to monitor a region s= o strategically situated near its border. Spanish Caribbean nations have raised their educational and socioeconomic standards, and many of them even enjoy democr= atic forms of government. They no longer need to fear or neutralize <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, to survive. Conditions leading to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pla= ce w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> economic embargo have disappeared, or changed considerably. Hence, an American change of policy i= n <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a= nd its acceptance by Castro’s successors, can be now implemented without any party “loosing face”.<o:p></o:p> There is one historical fact, however, that conspires against the development and implementation of negot= iations for a Transition. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cu= ba</st1:place></st1:country-region> has traditionally been a country of “single minded” leaders, du= bious virtue that has only brought disaster to our nation.<o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, our “mother countryR= 21;, let us bleed to annihilation during the 30 years of wars that culminated wi= th our independence. Spain’s motto: “hasta el últi= mo hombre y la última peseta” was much more than just rhetorical fanfarre. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><sp= an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;line-height:200%'>Spain</st1:place></st1= :country-region> systematically ignored multiple plans for peaceful transitions to autonomy developed during the XIX Century= : from Frs. Jose Agustin Caballero’s (1808) and Felix Varela’s (1821),= to Jose A. Saco’s (1848), up to Maura’s and the Partido Liberal Autonomista (1893). And when <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:s= t=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s separation finally occurred, as the result of the Spanish-Cuban-American Wa= r of 1898, it was <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</= st1:place></st1:country-region> and not the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:= place></st1:country-region> who prevented Cubans from participating in the <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Paris</st1:place></st1:City> negotiations: <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region> p= referred to deliver <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1= :place></st1:country-region> to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place= ></st1:country-region>, rather than to set us free.<o:p></o:p> During the republic things were= no better. Presidents Estrada Palma and Garcia Menocal called in (or threatene= d to do so) the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:p= lace></st1:country-region> marines, before negotiating with their internal opposition. Presidents Mach= ado and Batista also refused mediation efforts of the American ambassador and d= on Cosme de la Torriente, preferring revolutionary chaos and further dictators= hip than holding a rationale dialog with the opposition.<o:p></o:p> We hope that this time, just as= it occurred in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</s= t1:place></st1:country-region> after Franco’s death, Cubans on both sides of the differend will have= the talent and patriotism to put the interests of the Nation before those of th= eir political groups. We hope Cubans will finally be willing to reach a negotia= ted solution of our internal problems.<o:p></o:p> For, have no doubt, the model f= or the solution of the Cuban differend is not in <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Eastern Eu= rope</st1:place>, but in Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America= </st1:place></st1:country-region>. Consider, for example, what occurred with other life-long Caudillos of the past, who have died in office after long years of absolute rule: Dr. Rodrig= uez de Francia and Carlos A. Lopez in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Paraguay</st1:place></st1:country-region>, Juan Vicente Gomez = in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-regio= n>, Dr. Salazar and Marcelo Caetano in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w= :st=3D"on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Those are the models we have to study carefully, to devise a solution.<o:p>= </o:p> Summarizing, Castro’s nat= ural disappearance, and a change in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w= :st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy toward <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</= st1:place></st1:country-region> will provide the “face saving” conditions for Castro’s successors to participate in such negotiations, as long as all participating parties can feel safe about their fate after the Transition. This situation= is not much different to what occurred in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Brazil</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w= :st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Argentina</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-re= gion w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Chile</st1:place></st1:country-region>, = after the military returned the governments to the civilians, during the 1980s.<o= :p></o:p> The current window of opportuni= ty is open, but will not remain so, indefinitely. And, if we do not take advantag= e of it, the window will close again, returning us into the quagmire in which we have remained for the past half century.<o:p></o:p> Acknowledgements<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp; We thank our paper Discussant Dr. Alfred Cuzan, of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1= :PlaceName w:st=3D"on">West</st1:PlaceName> <st1:PlaceName w:st=3D"on">Florida</st1:P= laceName> <st1:PlaceType w:st=3D"on">University</st1:PlaceType></st1:place>, for his excellent and comprehensive critique of our initial draft and conference pr= esentation, which helped us improve our paper into this final product. <o:p></o:p></spa= n> <o:p> </o:p> About the Author:<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp; Jorge Luis Romeu is a Syracuse University Research Professor, and directs the Jua= rez Lincoln Marti (<a href=3D"http://web.cortland.edu/matresearch">http://web.c= ortland.edu/matresearch</a>) International Education Project. Romeu is a Fulbright Senior Speaker Specialist, with three tours in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and two in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Domin= ican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and has been a Fundayacucho consultant in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezu= ela</st1:place></st1:country-region>. = <o:p></o:p> Selected Bibliography<o:p></o:p> Arciniegas, G. Biografia d= el Caribe. <o:p></o:p> Alvarez Diaz et al. Cuba: Geopolitica y Pensamiento Economico. <o:p></o:p> Bosch, J. Historia Economi= co Social de la Republica Dominicana.<o:p></o:p> Balaguer, J. Memorias de un Cortesano de la Era de Trujillo.<o:p></o:p> Carpentier, A. El Reino de Este Mundo.<o:p></o:p> Ferrara, O. Mis Relaciones= con Maximo Gomez.<o:p></o:p> Franco Pichardo. Historia = de la Republica Dominicana. = <o:p></o:p> Franco, Jose Luciano. Anto= nio Maceo. <o:p></o:p> Garcia y Guerra (Eds.). La Habana-Veracruz: las dos orillas.<o:p></o:p> Garcia Marquez, G. Cien An= os de Soledad.<o:p></o:p> Gallegos, R. Dona Barbara<= /u>. <o:p></o:p> Guerra, R. Manual de Histo= ria de Cuba.<o:p></o:p> Gomez, M. Diario de Campan= a.<o:p></o:p> Krause, E. Los Caudillos</= u>.<o:p></o:p> Marrero, L. Geografia de C= uba. <o:p></o:p> Manach, J. Indagacion al Choteo.<o:p></o:p> Ortiz, Fernando. Contrapunteo Cubano del Azucar = y el Tabaco. <o:p></o:p> Reed, N. La Guerra de las Castas.<o:p></o:p> Romeu, R. Hostos, Antillan= ista y Ensayista.<o:p></o:p> Romeu, J. L. Cuba and the Gulf Pact.<o:p></o:p></s= pan> Romeu, J. L. Manach and Gomez Morin: a comparative stu= dy.<o:p></o:p> Rivera, J. E. La Voragine<= /u>.<o:p></o:p> Saco, J. A. Papeles; Contr= a la Anexion.<o:p></o:p> Villaverde, C. Cecilia Val= des. <o:p></o:p> Yepez Castillo. <sp= an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%'>Historia de Venezuela</u= >.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-list'><![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote' id=3Dftn1> <a style=3D'mso-footnote-id:ftn1' href=3D"#_ftnr= ef1" name=3D"_ftn1" title=3D""><![if !supportFootnotes]>[1]<![endif]></a> Rese= arch Professor in the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Dept., SU, and direct= or of the Juarez Lincoln Marti Int’l Ed. Project (<a href=3D"http://web.cortland.edu/matresearch">http://web.cortland.edu/matres= earch</a>). Fulbright Senior Speaker Specialist, with three tours in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= and two in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Rep= ublic</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Fundayacucho consultant in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-region>. </div> </div> </body> </html> ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40 Content-Location: file:///C:/894258C5/SpanCarAsce_files/header.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"> <head> <meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DProgId content=3DWord.Document> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11"> <meta name=3DOriginator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11"> <link id=3DMain-File rel=3DMain-File href=3D"../SpanCarAsce.htm"> <![if IE]> <base href=3D"file:///C:\894258C5\SpanCarAsce_files\header.htm" id=3D"webarch_temp_base_tag"> <![endif]><o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceT= ype"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceName"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"City"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"place"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"country-region"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"State"/> </head> <body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-separator' id=3Dfs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-continuation-separator' id=3Dfcs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:endnote-separator' id=3Des> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:endnote-continuation-separator' id=3Decs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footer' id=3Def1> <div style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around;mso-element-anchor-= vertical: paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margin;mso-element-left:right; mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'> <table cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 hspace=3D0 vspace=3D0 align=3Dright> <tr> <td valign=3Dtop align=3Dleft style=3D'padding-top:0in;padding-right:0in; padding-bottom:0in;padding-left:0in'> <p class=3DMsoFooter style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around; mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margi= n; mso-element-left:right;mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'><!-= -[if supportFields]>PAGE= <![endif]--><o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <o:p> </o:p> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footer' id=3Df1> <div style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around;mso-element-anchor-= vertical: paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margin;mso-element-left:right; mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'> <table cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 hspace=3D0 vspace=3D0 align=3Dright> <tr> <td valign=3Dtop align=3Dleft style=3D'padding-top:0in;padding-right:0in; padding-bottom:0in;padding-left:0in'> <p class=3DMsoFooter style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around; mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margi= n; mso-element-left:right;mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'><!-= -[if supportFields]>PAGE= <![endif]-->4<!-= -[if supportFields]></span= ><![endif]--><o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <o:p> </o:p> </div> </body> </html> ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40 Content-Location: file:///C:/894258C5/SpanCarAsce_files/filelist.xml Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8" <xml xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"> <o:MainFile HRef=3D"../SpanCarAsce.htm"/> <o:File HRef=3D"header.htm"/> <o:File HRef=3D"filelist.xml"/> </xml> ------=_NextPart

MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40" This document is a Single File Web Page, also known as a Web Archive file. If you are seeing this message, your browser or editor doesn't support Web Archive files. Please download a browser that supports Web Archive, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer. ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40 Content-Location: file:///C:/894258C5/SpanCarAsce.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" The Spanish Caribbean and its Influence in a Transicion in Cuba</tit= le> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceType"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceName"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"City"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"place"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"country-region"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"State"/>  <style>  </style>  </head> <body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple style=3D'tab-interval:.5in'> <div class=3DSection1> The Spanish <st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Caribbean</st1:place> and its Influence in a Transition in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region><o:p></o:p> Jorge Luis Romeu<a style=3D'mso-footnote-id:ftn1' href=3D"#_ftn1" name=3D"_ftnref1" title=3D""><![if !supportFootnotes]>[1]<![endif]></= span></a><o:p></o:p> <st1:place = w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Syracuse University</s= t1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">NY</st1:State><= /st1:place><o:p></o:p> <a href=3D"mailto:jromeu@ecs.syr.edu">jromeu@ecs= .syr.edu</a> <o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> ASCE XV Annual Conference<o:p></o:p> <st1:place = w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Miami</st1:City> <st1:State w:st=3D"on">FL</st1:State></= st1:place>, August of 2005<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p></sp= an> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>Introduction<o:p></o:p></h1> When Fidel Castro came to power= in 1959, Cubans on both sides of the political differend committed a costly st= rategic error. We allowed our internal struggle to become a football in the Cold War game. Castro sided with the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Soviet Union</st1:place>= , at a time when a nuclear war could destroy everything. The Cuban opposition sided with the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United Stat= es</st1:place></st1:country-region>, who sought to prevent the establishment of a Soviet foothold, 90 miles from= its shores. We Cubans have never learned that old American saying: “polit= ics ends at the water’s edge”. Nor have we learned from the Mexican lesson of Maximilian and the French intervention of the 1860’s, when = the conservatives, after loosing the civil war against Juarez and the Liberals,= requested their help.<o:p></o:p> In the case of Cuba, the United States launched its economic embargo, which Castro adroitly used, to bring together the country around him to face of a foreign enemy, as well as to p= lay little David, both very old strategies for such situation. And the Cuban op= position distanced itself from <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Latin America</st1:place> and = the Spanish Caribbean, because the region supported Fidel Castro and his government, fo= r practical political, economic, strategic and demagogic reasons. This was yet another = costly miscalculation, one that alienated the Cuban opposition from its natural La= tin American milieu. We failed to understand the real causes behind their behavior, and = to finesse its response adequately. <o:p></o:p> For, the Spanish Caribbean coun= tries did take advantage of the Cuban situation in at least three ways. First, we= all produce similar goods: sugar cane, tobacco, coffee, fruits and seafood. Our sister nations obtained the Cuban quotas in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D= "on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> markets, and also inherite= d the American tourism and economic investment. <o:p></o:p> But historically, this was no different from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region>’s policy during the 1790s, under Governor Luis de Las Casas and his Economic Adviser, don Francisco de Arango y Parreno. For, after the Africans revolte= d in Haiti destroying that island’s slave-based economy, Cuba seized the opportunity to launch its sugar and coffee industries that, until then, had= languished due to the intense competition of this French colony. Sleazy as this policy= may be, such is the usual procedure in international relations.<o:p></o:p></spa= n> Secondly, as the political atte= ntion of the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States= </st1:place></st1:country-region> focused on Castro’s <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, it eased on the other Spanish Caribbean countries, giving them greater lati= tude. Their governments thence, had an added interest in maintaining Castro’= ;s regime, from which they scored excellent points both, economically as well = as politically. <o:p></o:p> Finally, several of our sister republics were far from democratic, and could not provide a better life for their citizens. Hence, they found it convenient to nominally support the government in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana</st1:plac= e></st1:City>, while maintaining the privileges of their upper classes at home. For, such political posturing is appealing to their poverty-stricken masses and diver= ts the attention away from their own lack of civil and political liberties, go= ods and government services. Some people refer to such procedures as demagoguer= y. <o:p></o:p> We can summarize the above disc= ussion into three main reasons that have helped sustain the present Cuban regime f= or the past 46 years. They are (1) President Castro’s political shrewdne= ss and ability to survive, (2) the Cold War and the <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy toward <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a= nd (3) the economic and political interests of the Ibero American and other foreig= n countries, vis-à-vis the Cuban regime. <o:p></o:p> However, in the past few years = several significant events have occurred, directly affecting the above three circum= stances and opening a unique window of opportunity that facilitates a Transition to= a pluralistic system and a normalization of the Cuban situation.<o:p></o:p></= span> First, President Castro is clos= e to 80 years now, nearing the end of his natural life. His brother Raul, the official heir to <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cub= a</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s Presidency, has a slim chance of becoming his successor. For, there have be= en already two entire generations of capable leaders lost to the absolute cont= rol of the Castro clique. Finally, the deteriorated socioeconomic and political conditions inside the island encourage the possibility for negotiations bet= ween Castro’s younger successors, and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s internal and ext= ernal opposition. <o:p></o:p> Second, the end of the Cold War= more than a decade ago, has left the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> as the only world superpower, thus diminishing the danger of a nuclear confrontation. This allows the possibility of implementing a change in the 45-year-old American policy toward <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pla= ce w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, without the <st1:countr= y-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> loos= ing face or endangering its security. <o:p></o:p> Finally, Ibero <st1:country-reg= ion w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>= has advanced politically and economically, in the last half century, and its interests are now broader. Today, they can prosper without having to prey on the Cuban economy. And they need a stable and pluralistic <st1:country-regi= on w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> if= they really want to foster their own economic development and political pluralism that will bring even more support from the European Union, the <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> and = other <st1:place w:st=3D"on">First World</st1:place> governments.<o:p></o:p> The implementation of a peaceful transition, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region> or anywhere else however, requires a negotiation process between the opposi= tion and those at the helm. But such negotiations need the presence of a mutually acceptable arbiter or facilitator, to help negotiate the differences and to= guarantee the terms of the agreements. Such arbiter could naturally come from Ibero <= st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>= and the Spanish Caribbean, as occurred for example, during the bloody civil wars in= <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Central America</st1:place> in the 1980s.<o:p></o:p> But, at the present time, such = facilitators or arbiters are not likely to materialize, due to the lack of trust and eve= n dislike, between the Spanish Caribbean countries and the Cuban opposition. For, in addition to the elements discussed above, there are other historical and mo= re subjective reasons.<o:p></o:p> We Cubans have considered ourse= lves whiter, richer and more sophisticated, than most other Ibero American countries, du= e to our longer colonial status under <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region> first, and to the proxi= mity and special status with the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region>, later. This has made us feel superior, many times putting down our own and = looking north-ward, instead, like the statue of Diana Cazadora situated in Paseo de= la Reforma, in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico City</st1:p= lace></st1:City>. This attitude has not won many friends in Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D= "on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and adds a dimension= of resentment to the above-mentioned political and economic reasons for them to remain al= oof.<o:p></o:p> It is, however, imperative to s= how how much all the above reasons are passé and wrong, and conduce no where. It is imperative that Cubans recognize how we are a Spanish Caribbean nation and hence, of Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region>. And it is imperative to show the Spanish Caribbean nations how we will all gain, and not loose, if Cuba resolves its internal problems peacefully, thr= ough a process of negotiations facilitated by our own, and not by others, further away. This is what we try to do here.<o:p></o:p> Therefore, these are the two ob= jectives of our paper: to show how the Spanish Caribbean is Cuba’s political habitat, to which it belongs geographically and culturally, and to show how such habitat can play a major role in Cuba’s transition to pluralism, after President Castro’s natural and inevitable disappearance, provid= ing the badly needed facilitators and increasing its possibilities of successful oc= currence, in the minimum time and with the minimum cost.<o:p></o:p> In the rest of this paper we di= scuss the origins, development and fragmentation into isolated countries, of the peoples and nations integrating the Spanish Caribbean. Then, we discuss some implications of the participation of such nations in facilitating the proce= ss of a peaceful Transition to an open society in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"= on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>.<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>Common Historical Roots <o:p></o:p></h1> We spouse the hypothesis that t= he Spanish Caribbean is one, homogeneous, with specific characteristics in each country but with a common identity. One could then legitimately ask why it is that = today, such <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> is not united, but fragme= nted into a host of isolated, small, and poor countries. <o:p></o:p> To provide some answers to this= challenging question we must first define what we understand by the Spanish Caribbean: = the socioeconomic and cultural collection of islands and coastal areas of the Caribbean Basin proper, as well as selected coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico, which were colonized and held by Spain throughout the XVI to the XV= III Centuries and who struggled through independence wars and nation building in the XIX and XX Centuries. <o:p></o:p> Consequently, we do not include= in the Spanish Caribbean the islands colonized by the French, English or other Europeans, nor the parts of the Caribbean coast of Central America populate= d by the Black Caribs or Garifuna. We mean <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st= =3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:City>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:= country-region></st1:place>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st= 1:country-region>, plus the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> coasts of <st1:countr= y-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-regio= n>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Colombia</st1:place></st1:country-region= > and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Panama</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= the Gulf coast of the Mexican states of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st= =3D"on">Veracruz</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:State></st1:place> and <st1:State w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Campeche</st1:place></st1:State>, and to a lesser extent, sele= cted areas of the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> side of <st1:coun= try-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Honduras</st1:place></st1:country-region= > (e.g. <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">San Pedro Sula</st1:place></st1:City>) a= nd <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Costa Rica</st1:place></st1:country-regi= on>.<o:p></o:p> Their common characteristics are visible and evident, even to the weekend tourist. They include speaking the same language, practicing the same religion, playing the same music, dancin= g to the same rhythms, having similar ethnic mix, eating the same food and fruit= s, and having a common colonial history, including suffering the same Spanish neglect during the XVI to the XVIII centuries. <o:p></o:p> The proof is that we name our r= hythms (e.g. son, merengue, cumbia), our roots (e.g. yautia, yuca), our fruits (e.= g. lechosa, papaya, platano, banano), our fish (e.g. pargo, guachinango, chillo), etc. = with different names, when they are essentially the same. Finally, there may wel= l be less African blood in the mainland, and more in the islands of the Spanish Caribbean. But we all are all, at least culturally, a mixture of white and black with American Indian. <o:p></o:p> Our main colonial cities and to= wns (<st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">San Juan</st1:place></st1:City>, <st1:Ci= ty w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, La= Habana, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santiago</st1:place></st1:City= >, Porto Bello, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santa Marta</st1:place>= </st1:City>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cartagena</st1:place></st1:Cit= y>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Barranquilla</st1:place></st1:City>, <st= 1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Maracaibo</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"= on">Veracruz</st1:State></st1:place>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Campeche</st1:place></st1:Sta= te>, <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Merida</st1:place></st1:City>, etc.) were founded in the same century and look very much alike. Their traditional old sections are so similar, that often movies about one country are made in another. We wear the same guayaberas, use similar straw hats, smoke large cigars and play equally romantic and slow boleros, in our Spanish guitars. = But most important, we share this huge mass of water, with its beautiful beache= s, that some times unites us and other times, separates us.<o:p></o:p><= /p> Spanish colonialism formed our = souls, giving us its laws, political traditions, good and bad customs, and inventi= ng the Creole and the mestizo. Similar military authorities, absentee landowne= rs and corrupt and incompetent administrators, governed us, and similarly independent-minded Creoles practiced extensive and illicit commerce with the buccaneers. These American-born Spaniards now lived side by side with Afric= ans, both slaves and free, frequently mixing with them, and thus fusioning into = this semi-magic combination of European, Amerindian and African that is our Span= ish Caribbean ethnicity and culture. If you doubt it, go back and re-read Cien = Anos de Soledad.<o:p></o:p> Historical examples of such com= mon policies and customs also abound. In <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, the Spanish governor burned cities and haciendas in the eastern part of the island (<st1:country-region w:st=3D"on= "><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>) in the XVII century, t= o eradicate the illicit commerce of its inhabitants, forcing them to relocate to the ea= stern side (now, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region>). This facilitated the take-ove= r of the western part of <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Hispaniola</st1:place> by the Fr= ench. In <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place><= /st1:country-region>, the Spanish governors could never deter similar commerce in the eastern par= t of the island, where cities like Bayamo amassed its great wealth, based on con= traband.<o:p></o:p> The peoples of the Spanish Cari= bbean became homogeneous because they were formed in a slow process that took 300 years.= The discovery of gold and silver in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Peru</st1:place>= </st1:country-region> during the mid 1500s, where the conquistadors could become rich very quickl= y, helped empty the Spanish Caribbean. Most Spaniards who initially had settled in the islands left, taking their slaves, their Amerindian servants and even their animals. Those few who stayed, languished and mixed with the remaining slav= es and Indians, for the next three centuries. As a result, <st1:place w:st=3D"= on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:City>, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on">Cuba= </st1:country-region></st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> and the other parts of the r= egion were, at the end of the XVIII Century, approximately 1/3 white (Spaniards and Cre= oles), 1/3 mixed race and free, and 1/3 black or Amerindian, mostly slaves and indentured servants. However, the majority of these slaves had been born in= the Spanish Caribbean, spoke Spanish as their first language and had acquired m= any customs of the other two ethnic groups.<o:p></o:p> By contrast, in the French and English colonies, Europeans were very few (less than 10%) and most of them, were transient employees of commercial plantations that stayed for only a f= ixed period of time. The slaves (the remaining 90%) were so badly mistreated, th= at thousands had to be imported every year, to replace the dying. As a result, the major= ity of the population was integrated by slaves recently brought from <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Africa</st1:place>, with no common language and no bonds, eithe= r with the people or with the land itself. Finally, there were few mixed-race or f= ree blacks, that could serve as an ethnic or social buffer between races, or between the socioeconomic classes. <o:p></o:p> This situation worsened in the = XIX Century, when Chinese and East Indian indentured servants (read, slaves) we= re brought in large quantities to work in the fields, once African slavery was formally abolished. As a consequence, islands like <st1:place w:st=3D"on">T= rinidad</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Tobago</st1:place> and <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Curaca= o</st1:place>, and nations like <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Sur= iname</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Guyana</st1:plac= e></st1:country-region>, live under great social and racial tensions from the different racial, reli= gious and linguistic groups that populate them and who have never integrated. <o:= p></o:p> The explosive economic, social = and ethnic composition in the French and English colonies led, for example, to = the bloody and violent slave rebellion of 1794 in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and the subsequent mas= sacre of the white population. The proof that in the Spanish Caribbean social conditions were different is that, after the 1822 Haitian invasion and subs= equent occupation of <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</s= t1:place></st1:City> (which lasted for 22 years) no massacres of whites ever occurred. Slavery w= as indeed abolished by Haitian President Boyer, and a land reform among the former sl= aves, at the expense of the property of the church and the state, was implemented= . But white Hateros and merchants kept their properties and wealth. And when in 1= 844, the war for independence started, white, black and mixed race Dominicans equally fought to expel the Haitian invader. For, it was not the color of the sk= in, but the language, religion, culture and customs what defined the inhabitant= s of Santo Domingo –as well as what defines the people from the Spanish Ca= ribbean.<o:p></o:p> Another salient characteristic = of the region, and one which greatly facilitated its homogeneity, was the ease of communication. Hundreds of sailboats crisscrossed the <st1:place w:st=3D"on= ">Caribbean</st1:place> during the XV to XIX Centuries, carrying goods and products, people, news, = etc. Its inhabitants constantly moved from one place to another. Examples of well-known military, political and cultural leaders, that moved around in t= hese areas during the XIX Century include Bolivar (in Haiti), Duarte (in Puerto Rico), Maceo and Maximo Gomez (in Honduras, Costa Rica), Marti (in Mexico a= nd Venezuela), Henriquez Urenas (in Cuba) and Hostos (in the Dominican Republi= c). <o:p></o:p> During the XX Century Romulo Betanc= ourt and Juan Bosch lived in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, A. Sanchez Arango, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on= ">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and Castro, in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexic= o</st1:place></st1:country-region>. World-renown artists Rafael Hernandez, Agustin Lara, Armando Manzanero and Celia Cruz lived and worked everywhere in the region. This author’s o= wn family came from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1= :place></st1:country-region> to <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></= st1:City> during the XVIII Century, where our first American ancestor was born. In the following 250 years, the family moved to <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico= </st1:place> and finally to <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba<= /st1:place></st1:country-region>, leaving many collateral family members all over the region, in their wake. = <o:p></o:p> Such movements of peoples and g= oods were possible because, for over 300 years, these areas were part of <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, = and all its inhabitants held a common nationality. There was no currency to exchang= e, no new language to learn, no passports or visas to apply for, no work permi= ts to request, all of which facilitated these common and frequent exchanges. E= ven in the coastal areas of the mainland colonies, such as <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Colombia</st1:place></st1:country-region= > or <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= with richer and stronger governments, people still preferred maritime travel along the = <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place>, to avoid the perils and difficulties of = the slower and less comfortable land travel. For this reason the Spanish Caribb= ean people remained closer to each other, than to their own political and administrative colonial kindred. <o:p></o:p> For example, peoples from <st1:= place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Veracruz</st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"o= n">Campeche</st1:State></st1:place> and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Merida</st1:place></st1:Ci= ty>, traditionally preferred to travel to <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana<= /st1:place></st1:City> by schooners (goletas) for health, educational or business reasons, than to= <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico City</st1:place></st1:City>, by l= and. And in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:pl= ace></st1:country-region>, which up to the XVIII Century was administratively dependent from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, pe= ople traveled from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caracas</st1:pla= ce></st1:City> to Ciudad Primada (<st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domin= go</st1:place></st1:City>), as well as from <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cartagena</st1= :place></st1:City> and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Barranquilla</st1:place></= st1:City>, via La Guaira. This situation persisted even after the region’s indep= endence, and well into the XX Century when finally good roads and railroads were bui= lt and the airplane appeared. <o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>The Winds of Change <o:p></o:p></h1> Such was the situation up to the start of the Latin American independence movement, in the early XIX Century, when most Spanish colonies became separate nations. Then, the first legal a= nd economic impediments to free interaction within the Spanish Caribbean, appeared. Local caudillos and dictators, such as Paez in Venezuela, and San= ta Anna in Mexico, and those who followed them during the XIX and XX Century, = as well as the Spanish colonial authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, were not interested in having their subjects move freely, escaping their control and exploitation. <o:p></o:p> In spite of this, the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> still provided the fastest, most economic= al and technically feasible means of transportation, making any policy of isolatio= nism very difficult to enforce. Thus, for economic reasons the Spanish Caribbean remained a homogeneous entity, even when it started showing the first signs= of differentiation.<o:p></o:p> For, the region started separat= ing ideologically. For example, <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> remained Spanish colonie= s, and <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1= :City> became, first a Haitian and later a Spanish domain. It was not until the se= cond half of the XIX Century that the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region> obtained i= ts total independence, only to become a poor, weak and unstable republic, like many = of the other Spanish Caribbean countries.&nbs= p; <o:p></o:p> Then, a new factor appeared in = the region. Since the 1820’s, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pl= ace w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>, an emerging re= gional power, had become increasingly noticeable in the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Car= ibbean</st1:place>, its southern and natural border. With its growing military, economic and industrial power, and its stable republican system that included the possib= ility of maintaining slavery, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> became a very attractive option for the landed classes and the aristocrats = of the Spanish Caribbean. Hence, in many of these countries, the prospect of Annexation to the American Union was not only strongly considered, but acti= vely pursued.<o:p></o:p> In <st1:country-region w:st=3D"= on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, for example, the Annexa= tion movement had a strong following between 1810 and 1865 among large plantation owners such as Madan and Aldama. The Narciso Lopez expedition that landed i= n <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cardenas</st1:place></st1:City> in 1853 displaying our Cuban flag for the first time was part of the annexation movement. Only after Jose A. Saco, political leader and scholar, openly opp= osed such ideology and proposed the autonomy option as one more appropriate for = <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, d= id the annexation idea begin to dwindle.<o:p></o:p> In <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Santo Domingo</st1:place></st1:City>, Presidents Santana and B= aez were also annexionists. Pedro Santana re-established the Spanish suzerainty= in the island during 1860-64, while Buenaventura Baez sought, first the French= and later the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:pl= ace></st1:country-region> annexation, without much success. During the Mexican-American war of 1846-4= 8, and later during the War of the Castes (1848-1852), <st1:State w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:place></st1:State> (which at the time included today’s states of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1:City w:st=3D"on">Merida= </st1:City>, <st1:State w:st=3D"on">Yucatan</st1:State></st1:place> and Quintana Roo) t= oyed with the though of incorporation to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st= 1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. <o:p></o:p></s= pan> When the American Civil War put= an end to slavery, Spanish Caribbean aristocrat interest in joining the <st1:c= ountry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> wane= d. However, a sentiment of inferiority persisted among some, who longed for political and economic stability at all costs and believed that our nations were unable to govern themselves. Such individuals entertained the idea of a limited national sovereignty, under foreign tutelage, fueling the frequent = interventions that we have suffered in the last two centuries. Examples are too numerous = to name.<o:p></o:p> <o:p> </o:p> Cuban <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Indepe= ndence</st1:place></st1:City> and the XX Century <o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> fought several wars for its independence, starting in 1868. These armed struggles did not succeed for internal political and economic differences in the island. In the eastern p= art, conditions were similar to those previously described for other regions of = the Spanish Caribbean. The western part, with its huge sugar plantations and co= nstant importation of slaves, had become a small-scale version of the model that t= he French had developed in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Haiti</st1:place></st1:country-region>. And Cubans still remembered what had happened there in 1794. <o:p></o:p></s= pan> However, the first independence= war (1868-78), even when lost, produced large effects. Slavery was officially abolished, a= nd a free press, a pro-autonomy political party, and very defective and unfair, = but regular elections were finally allowed.<o:p></o:p> Cuban independence was finally obtained in 1898, but only after the plantation system in the Western provi= nces had been destroyed by the war, and a coalition known as Partido Revoluciona= rio Cubano, was forged by Jose Marti. The war was won with the military aid of = the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-r= egion>, which acquired <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Puerto Rico</st1:place> and the <st1:= country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Philippines</st1:place></st1:country-reg= ion> from <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:plac= e></st1:country-region>. As a result of this war, the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:s= t=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> emerged as a world power, thus increasing yet further its economic and political influence in the Spanish Caribbean. <o:p></o:p> The rest of the <st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> territories (e.g. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Ja= maica</st1:place></st1:country-region>, the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Lesser Antilles</st1:place>, <st1:place w:st=3D"= on">Curacao</st1:place>) remained in the hands of powerful European nations, thus minimizing the <st= 1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> infl= uence. But the small, poor and disorganized Spanish Caribbean republics became an object of the American foreign policy in the region. American military intervention and political manipulation of leaders and governments were frequent, generating a sentiment of ill-will against the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">United States</st1:place></st1:country-r= egion>. Such sentiment was later exploited by unscrupulous political leaders, contr= ibuting to increase social and political instability in our countries, and providin= g support for several XX Century nationalist and anti-American movements.<o:p></o:p><= /span> Summarizing, the Spanish Caribb= ean, which under <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</s= t1:place></st1:country-region> and until the early XIX Century was united and homogeneous, slowly began separating into several weak and disorganized nations. Frequent government incompetence and corruption increased their poverty as well as their politi= cal instability, bringing about dictatorial regimes. <o:p></o:p> We can establish a parallel bet= ween the current state of the Spanish Caribbean, and that of the Roman provinces= in the <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mediterranean</st1:place>, after the fall of <st= 1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Rome</st1:place></st1:City> in 425. Thes= e provinces were invaded by barbarians, who established weak and unstable kingdoms that brought 1000 years of backwardness and chaos, known in European history as = the Dark or Middle Ages. After centuries of struggle, <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:= st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">France</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Italy</st1:place></st1:country-region> j= oined several other nations to integrate the European Union, through which these Mediterranean countries have again achieved world influence and clout.<o:p>= </o:p> <o:p></o:p>= <h1 style=3D'line-height:200%'>The Spanish <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Caribbean</st1:place> in a Possible Transiti= on<o:p></o:p></h1> This brings us to our main topi= c: how can the Spanish Caribbean and Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pl= ace w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region> help develop a peacef= ul Transition in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</= st1:place></st1:country-region>? For, there are two parties to this negotiation: the government in <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Havana</st1:place></st1:City>, and the o= pposition (internal and abroad) and we need to pose some hard questions. What can bot= h of these parties offer each other? How can they guarantee their promises? Who = can facilitate and mediate these conversations? <o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region> is economically and politicall= y exhausted. The opposition can offer the government, in exchange for a transition to political and economic pluralism, much needed economic aid, technical know-= how, their international business connections and internal stability. Economic a= id would rapidly increase the wealth of the nation, as well as the socioeconom= ic level of the individuals, thus bringing internal peace.<o:p></o:p></= p> To guarantee these promises, as= well as the safety and integrity of the government officials, the negotiations n= eed of arbiters other than the Cuban government, the internal and external opposition, or the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">U= nited States</st1:place></st1:country-region>. For, as interested parties, neit= her the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></= st1:country-region> nor the Cuban opposition will be trusted by the Cuban officials, or vice-ve= rsa. However, such trusted arbiters can come from Ibero <st1:country-region w:st= =3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Western Europe</st1:place>, especially from the Spanish Caribbean nations, who hav= e a strong interest in the economic and political stability of the region to wh= ich we all belong.<o:p></o:p> Further more, all parts to this negotiation are today in a better position to work toward a negotiated Tran= sition. The <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></= st1:country-region> is the sole, remaining superpower and no longer needs to monitor a region s= o strategically situated near its border. Spanish Caribbean nations have raised their educational and socioeconomic standards, and many of them even enjoy democr= atic forms of government. They no longer need to fear or neutralize <st1:country= -region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, to survive. Conditions leading to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:pla= ce w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> economic embargo have disappeared, or changed considerably. Hence, an American change of policy i= n <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>, a= nd its acceptance by Castro’s successors, can be now implemented without any party “loosing face”.<o:p></o:p> There is one historical fact, however, that conspires against the development and implementation of negot= iations for a Transition. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cu= ba</st1:place></st1:country-region> has traditionally been a country of “single minded” leaders, du= bious virtue that has only brought disaster to our nation.<o:p></o:p> <st1:count= ry-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region>, our “mother countryR= 21;, let us bleed to annihilation during the 30 years of wars that culminated wi= th our independence. Spain’s motto: “hasta el últi= mo hombre y la última peseta” was much more than just rhetorical fanfarre. <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on"><sp= an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;line-height:200%'>Spain</st1:place></st1= :country-region> systematically ignored multiple plans for peaceful transitions to autonomy developed during the XIX Century= : from Frs. Jose Agustin Caballero’s (1808) and Felix Varela’s (1821),= to Jose A. Saco’s (1848), up to Maura’s and the Partido Liberal Autonomista (1893). And when <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:s= t=3D"on">Cuba</st1:place></st1:country-region>’s separation finally occurred, as the result of the Spanish-Cuban-American Wa= r of 1898, it was <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</= st1:place></st1:country-region> and not the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:= place></st1:country-region> who prevented Cubans from participating in the <st1:City w:st=3D"on"><st1:p= lace w:st=3D"on">Paris</st1:place></st1:City> negotiations: <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</st1:place></st1:country-region> p= referred to deliver <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</st1= :place></st1:country-region> to the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:place= ></st1:country-region>, rather than to set us free.<o:p></o:p> During the republic things were= no better. Presidents Estrada Palma and Garcia Menocal called in (or threatene= d to do so) the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">US</st1:p= lace></st1:country-region> marines, before negotiating with their internal opposition. Presidents Mach= ado and Batista also refused mediation efforts of the American ambassador and d= on Cosme de la Torriente, preferring revolutionary chaos and further dictators= hip than holding a rationale dialog with the opposition.<o:p></o:p> We hope that this time, just as= it occurred in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Spain</s= t1:place></st1:country-region> after Franco’s death, Cubans on both sides of the differend will have= the talent and patriotism to put the interests of the Nation before those of th= eir political groups. We hope Cubans will finally be willing to reach a negotia= ted solution of our internal problems.<o:p></o:p> For, have no doubt, the model f= or the solution of the Cuban differend is not in <st1:place w:st=3D"on">Eastern Eu= rope</st1:place>, but in Ibero <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">America= </st1:place></st1:country-region>. Consider, for example, what occurred with other life-long Caudillos of the past, who have died in office after long years of absolute rule: Dr. Rodrig= uez de Francia and Carlos A. Lopez in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Paraguay</st1:place></st1:country-region>, Juan Vicente Gomez = in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-regio= n>, Dr. Salazar and Marcelo Caetano in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w= :st=3D"on">Portugal</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Those are the models we have to study carefully, to devise a solution.<o:p>= </o:p> Summarizing, Castro’s nat= ural disappearance, and a change in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w= :st=3D"on">US</st1:place></st1:country-region> policy toward <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Cuba</= st1:place></st1:country-region> will provide the “face saving” conditions for Castro’s successors to participate in such negotiations, as long as all participating parties can feel safe about their fate after the Transition. This situation= is not much different to what occurred in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1= :place w:st=3D"on">Brazil</st1:place></st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w= :st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Argentina</st1:place></st1:country-region> and <st1:country-re= gion w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Chile</st1:place></st1:country-region>, = after the military returned the governments to the civilians, during the 1980s.<o= :p></o:p> The current window of opportuni= ty is open, but will not remain so, indefinitely. And, if we do not take advantag= e of it, the window will close again, returning us into the quagmire in which we have remained for the past half century.<o:p></o:p> Acknowledgements<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp; We thank our paper Discussant Dr. Alfred Cuzan, of <st1:place w:st=3D"on"><st1= :PlaceName w:st=3D"on">West</st1:PlaceName> <st1:PlaceName w:st=3D"on">Florida</st1:P= laceName> <st1:PlaceType w:st=3D"on">University</st1:PlaceType></st1:place>, for his excellent and comprehensive critique of our initial draft and conference pr= esentation, which helped us improve our paper into this final product. <o:p></o:p></spa= n> <o:p> </o:p> About the Author:<o:p></o:p> &= nbsp; Jorge Luis Romeu is a Syracuse University Research Professor, and directs the Jua= rez Lincoln Marti (<a href=3D"http://web.cortland.edu/matresearch">http://web.c= ortland.edu/matresearch</a>) International Education Project. Romeu is a Fulbright Senior Speaker Specialist, with three tours in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place = w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and two in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Domin= ican Republic</st1:place></st1:country-region>, and has been a Fundayacucho consultant in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Venezu= ela</st1:place></st1:country-region>. = <o:p></o:p> Selected Bibliography<o:p></o:p> Arciniegas, G. Biografia d= el Caribe. <o:p></o:p> Alvarez Diaz et al. Cuba: Geopolitica y Pensamiento Economico. <o:p></o:p> Bosch, J. Historia Economi= co Social de la Republica Dominicana.<o:p></o:p> Balaguer, J. Memorias de un Cortesano de la Era de Trujillo.<o:p></o:p> Carpentier, A. El Reino de Este Mundo.<o:p></o:p> Ferrara, O. Mis Relaciones= con Maximo Gomez.<o:p></o:p> Franco Pichardo. Historia = de la Republica Dominicana. = <o:p></o:p> Franco, Jose Luciano. Anto= nio Maceo. <o:p></o:p> Garcia y Guerra (Eds.). La Habana-Veracruz: las dos orillas.<o:p></o:p> Garcia Marquez, G. Cien An= os de Soledad.<o:p></o:p> Gallegos, R. Dona Barbara<= /u>. <o:p></o:p> Guerra, R. Manual de Histo= ria de Cuba.<o:p></o:p> Gomez, M. Diario de Campan= a.<o:p></o:p> Krause, E. Los Caudillos</= u>.<o:p></o:p> Marrero, L. Geografia de C= uba. <o:p></o:p> Manach, J. Indagacion al Choteo.<o:p></o:p> Ortiz, Fernando. Contrapunteo Cubano del Azucar = y el Tabaco. <o:p></o:p> Reed, N. La Guerra de las Castas.<o:p></o:p> Romeu, R. Hostos, Antillan= ista y Ensayista.<o:p></o:p> Romeu, J. L. Cuba and the Gulf Pact.<o:p></o:p></s= pan> Romeu, J. L. Manach and Gomez Morin: a comparative stu= dy.<o:p></o:p> Rivera, J. E. La Voragine<= /u>.<o:p></o:p> Saco, J. A. Papeles; Contr= a la Anexion.<o:p></o:p> Villaverde, C. Cecilia Val= des. <o:p></o:p> Yepez Castillo. <sp= an style=3D'font-size:12.0pt;line-height:150%'>Historia de Venezuela</u= >.<o:p></o:p> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-list'><![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote' id=3Dftn1> <a style=3D'mso-footnote-id:ftn1' href=3D"#_ftnr= ef1" name=3D"_ftn1" title=3D""><![if !supportFootnotes]>[1]<![endif]></a> Rese= arch Professor in the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Dept., SU, and direct= or of the Juarez Lincoln Marti Int’l Ed. Project (<a href=3D"http://web.cortland.edu/matresearch">http://web.cortland.edu/matres= earch</a>). Fulbright Senior Speaker Specialist, with three tours in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Mexico</st1:place></st1:country-region>,= and two in the <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st=3D"on">Dominican Rep= ublic</st1:place></st1:country-region>. Fundayacucho consultant in <st1:country-region w:st=3D"on"><st1:place w:st= =3D"on">Venezuela</st1:place></st1:country-region>. </div> </div> </body> </html> ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40 Content-Location: file:///C:/894258C5/SpanCarAsce_files/header.htm Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset="us-ascii" <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:st1=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"> <head> <meta http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3Dus-ascii"> <meta name=3DProgId content=3DWord.Document> <meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11"> <meta name=3DOriginator content=3D"Microsoft Word 11"> <link id=3DMain-File rel=3DMain-File href=3D"../SpanCarAsce.htm"> <![if IE]> <base href=3D"file:///C:\894258C5\SpanCarAsce_files\header.htm" id=3D"webarch_temp_base_tag"> <![endif]><o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceT= ype"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"PlaceName"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"City"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"place"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"country-region"/> <o:SmartTagType namespaceuri=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" name=3D"State"/> </head> <body lang=3DEN-US link=3Dblue vlink=3Dpurple> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-separator' id=3Dfs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footnote-continuation-separator' id=3Dfcs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:endnote-separator' id=3Des> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1 width=3D"33%"> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:endnote-continuation-separator' id=3Decs> <![if !supportFootnotes]> <hr align=3Dleft size=3D1> <![endif]> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footer' id=3Def1> <div style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around;mso-element-anchor-= vertical: paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margin;mso-element-left:right; mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'> <table cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 hspace=3D0 vspace=3D0 align=3Dright> <tr> <td valign=3Dtop align=3Dleft style=3D'padding-top:0in;padding-right:0in; padding-bottom:0in;padding-left:0in'> <p class=3DMsoFooter style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around; mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margi= n; mso-element-left:right;mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'><!-= -[if supportFields]>PAGE= <![endif]--><o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <o:p> </o:p> </div> <div style=3D'mso-element:footer' id=3Df1> <div style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around;mso-element-anchor-= vertical: paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margin;mso-element-left:right; mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'> <table cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 hspace=3D0 vspace=3D0 align=3Dright> <tr> <td valign=3Dtop align=3Dleft style=3D'padding-top:0in;padding-right:0in; padding-bottom:0in;padding-left:0in'> <p class=3DMsoFooter style=3D'mso-element:frame;mso-element-wrap:around; mso-element-anchor-vertical:paragraph;mso-element-anchor-horizontal:margi= n; mso-element-left:right;mso-element-top:.05pt;mso-height-rule:exactly'><!-= -[if supportFields]>PAGE= <![endif]-->4<!-= -[if supportFields]></span= ><![endif]--><o:p></o:p> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <o:p> </o:p> </div> </body> </html> ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40 Content-Location: file:///C:/894258C5/SpanCarAsce_files/filelist.xml Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/xml; charset="utf-8" <xml xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"> <o:MainFile HRef=3D"../SpanCarAsce.htm"/> <o:File HRef=3D"header.htm"/> <o:File HRef=3D"filelist.xml"/> </xml> ------=_NextPart_01C922D8.44628F40--